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REGULATION AND INNOVATIVE FINANCE FOR 






Achieving greater renewable energy usage, energy efficiency, and energy 
security are practically universal goals today. Key emerging trends to this effect 
include the promotion of electric vehicles, deployment of smart grids and smart 
meters, as well as technology and regulation to encourage storage and demand 
response mechanisms. Overall, there is a move towards greater flexibility, with 
consumers having more control over their electricity usage and costs. This 
Article introduces business models to illustrate the roles of multiple actors in a 
decentralized smart grid system. It identifies interactions between the various 
players, the tools they will manage, the added value in using the functionalities 
of such a system, and ways to maximize profits for those involved. The Article 
also examines the United Kingdom (UK) as a case study. It explores where the 
UK stands in terms of introducing tools and technologies for decentralization, 
including electric vehicles, smart grids, and demand response mechanisms. It 
also examines regulation in the UK to assess how conducive it is for 
decentralized energy. In addition, the Article identifies specific concerns related 
to data protection stemming from smart metering and analyses relevant 
regulation in this regard. 
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INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 
In this Article, we introduce a set of archetype business models (BMs), 
aiming to illustrate the roles of the multiple actors in the decentralized smart grid 
and identify the composite services that may be realized from their interactions. 
In this context, each business model focuses on the commercial exploitation of 
a set of tools that each involved actor manages and investigates the added value 
to be provided by the joint utilization of the functionalities. The objectives are 
economically oriented, in the sense that they target to maximize the potential 
profits for the participating actors.  
The BMs are characterized as “archetype,” because they aim to account for 
the entire set of services in which each tool may play a role. The archetype BMs 
can be used and tailored by adopters of Smart Grid solutions (tools, applications 
and services) in order to better exploit the added value from their offerings and 
reinforce their market impact.  
In our methodology, the archetype BMs are presented graphically using 
value networks and business modeling canvas that describe the 
assets/products/tools (using as an example/use case the EU WiseGRID project,1 
as discussed in Section II.2) to be utilized for achieving the objectives and the 
anticipated economic gains for each core participating actor. As it will become 
apparent, the Smart Grid tools are designed to meet this target by achieving the 
optimal utilization of the existing generation resources, suggesting the least 
costly consumption schedules and contributing to the smooth integration of 
innovative technologies and mechanisms (EVs, batteries, demand response 
(DR)) in the smart grid. Moreover, a crucial part of our methodology is the 
generation of a generic value network for Smart Grids that is used as a basis for 
the analysis of the separate archetype BMs. This generic value network is 
presented in Section II.1 and can be used from the energy community 
stakeholders as a template for business models in the Smart Grid environment. 
Such generic networks are currently missing from the existing literature.  
The analysis attributes great importance in defining the gains provided by 
each individual tool for each specific actor who participates in the value 
network. This process firstly requires determining their ownership, i.e., which 
actor bears their development and operational cost (or pays the relevant license 
to a third party) and receives the revenues from their management. In most of 
 
 1 WiseGRID is a research project (number 731205) funded by the EU’s Horizon 2020 research and 
innovation program. Professor Dr. Rafael Leal-Arcas is one of the Principal Investigators. See generally 
WISEGRID, www.wisegrid.eu (last visited Feb. 11, 2020). 
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the cases, each involved actor manages a single tool. This approach is followed 
in order to demonstrate the highest possible granularity of the value networks 
and investigate if such conditions allow for lucrative business models to appear. 
We mention beforehand that this approach may be extended to capture hybrid 
cases, when one actor undertakes multiple roles and consequently bears the cost 
and gains the profits related to the management of more than one tool. 
Focus is given to the commercial exploitation tools whose sophistication 
provides the optimal local consumption and production schedules at the 
prosumers’ premises. According to the basic business model, these tools are 
managed by an energy service company (ESCO), which elaborates the necessary 
data and provides the optimal suggestions to the prosumers. The ESCO receives 
as payment a portion of the prosumer’s savings due to the decreased electricity 
bill or a part of their compensation (provided by other actors, e.g. the virtual 
power plant (VPP) Operator) for their participation in the considered services 
(e.g. an explicit DR event). This form of revenues is aligned with the report of 
the European Commission,2 which suggests the Energy Performance Contacting 
(EPC) as the financial model between the ESCOs and the prosumers. 
Essentially, the EPC model implies that “remuneration of the ESCO is directly 
tied to the energy savings achieved,” and thus transfers the risk of the investment 
to the ESCO and encourages the market competitions between such companies. 
In the following sections, we describe the potential risks that may arise from 
these forms of revenue, which make the engagement of the ESCO questionable 
and propose further candidate revenue schemes aiming to prevent a possible 
market failure. A similar rationale is also followed for the actor(s) who should 
bear the capex cost of the innovative technology (such as the charging stations) 
because this factor may be beneficial for multiple participants in the value 
network. 
For all the BMs, our analysis provides preliminary insight into the state of 
the grid in the absence of these tools and the innovative technology, and 
consequently the actors’ increased costs or the limited revenue due to the lack 
of their sophistication and the advances capabilities that they respectively 
provide. This process is a prerequisite for identifying the “business as usual 
case,” which is commonly considered the comparison benchmark for identifying 
the source of the added value and quantify the potential benefits for the actors. 
Finally, the following Sections document the technical, regulatory, and 
behavioral barriers that may prevent the realization of such BMs and question 
 
 2 The European Commission’s Science and Knowledge Service, EUR. COMM’N: EU SCI HUB, https://ec. 
europa.eu/jrc/en/energy-efficiency/eed-support/energy-service-companies (last updated Nov. 14, 2016). 
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the lucrative exploitation of the involved tools in the market and sketch the 
roadmap for the mitigation of this risk. 
Finally, it is mentioned that the complex environment of the smart grid with 
multiple interacting actors, allows to potentially design additional and more 
complicated scenarios than those described. Some of these possible alternatives 
are documented in the following sections, along with the basic scenario that is 
considered. We emphasize that our novel methodology is suitable for capturing 
such extensions and the value network graphs may be appropriately modified to 
depict the flows of money and information that correspond to each case. 
After this Introduction, this Article provides in Section II an analysis of 
decentralized energy by examining the various archetype business models and 
barriers. Section III then analyzes the example of the United Kingdom as a case 
study. Section IV concludes. 
I. DECENTRALIZED ENERGY: ARCHETYPE BUSINESS MODELS AND BARRIERS  
A. A Generic Value Network for Smart Grids  
Figure 1 presents a generic value network for Smart Grids. It depicts ten key 
business roles and their interactions in terms of power, information, and money 
flows. This generic value network does not aim to represent all the business roles 
and all the possible interactions between the various stakeholders, as this is not 
possible due to the composite and rapidly evolving nature of the Smart Grids. 
However, it represents a vast number of scenarios and the most important 
players. Its purpose is to serve as a guideline/template for creating and analyzing 
various business cases and scenarios toward a decentralized Smart Grid.  
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Figure 1: The Archetype Value Network for Smart Grids 
In its current form, the generic value network includes the following “core” 
business roles:  
1. Power Production that is responsible for the power generation, using 
either fossil fuels or Renewable Energy Sources (RES). This role may 
include multiple actors independently of their size, i.e. from large power 
plants to small residential prosumers.  
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2. The Power Transmission grid is operated by the Transmission System 
Operator (TSO)s and provides High-Voltage transmission from the 
generation units and interconnection services between the distribution 
grids. The TSO is responsible for the maintenance of the transmission 
system and must also take the necessary actions (capacity development) 
to guarantee its ability to satisfy the evolving demand.  
3. The Power Distribution grid is operated by the Distribution System 
Operators (DSO). It is connected with the transmission grid and 
provides Low (or Medium) Voltage power to end users. The DSO is 
responsible for operating the transmission system and planning the 
necessary capacity expansion adequate enough to satisfy the future 
demand. His role is also crucial for the incorporation of distributed 
generators in the smart grid.  
4. The Wholesale Market Operation combines the information of the 
production cost and demand forecasting to compute the wholesale 
prices and propagate them to the generators, the retailers, and the 
aggregators.  
5. The Power Retailers perform the final sale of power to end users. 
These agents try to forecast in accuracy the future demand and reserve 
the adequate amount in the wholesale market, which they resell to their 
customers. 
6. The Balance Services, provided by the Balancing Responsible Party, 
who operates as an intermediator between the Wholesale Market and 
the Retailers. This agent is responsible to guarantee that the quantity 
reserved by the retailers is actually consumed. 
7. The Aggregators offer intermediate services between the end users and 
the other participants in the Smart Grid. They are responsible for 
designing and providing the sophistication for the orchestration of 
multiple appliances, such that their collective consumption scheduling 
results in benefits to their owners and a remarkable positive effect for 
the grid. The appliances may belong to multiple individual users with 
personal interests or to a single entity (for instance a fleet of EVs). 
8. The Energy Efficiency and Management Services role may be 
undertaken by the relevant companies or organizations, such as the EV 
Fleet manager, the Battery Operator, the ESCBOs, and Renewable 
Energy Service Companies (RESCOs). These agents operate as 
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intermediators between the aggregator and the end-users and offer the 
necessary equipment (e.g., Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE), 
smart meter, Building Management Systems (BMS) and automated 
operations (e.g. Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP)), which allow a 
consumption schedule to be realized (e.g. Automated DR event).  
9. Power Consumption refers to all electrical appliances that consume 
power for their real time operation. As it becomes apparent below, we 
choose to distinguish between power consumption and energy storage, 
because the latter term refers to appliances (batteries), which consume 
power for supplying energy for other devices or inserting it to the grid.  
10. The Energy Storage refers to the means which capture/store the 
produced electricity for some future use. We choose to assign a separate 
role for energy storage even though it could be also represented as a 
combination of consumption and production. This is because batteries 
do not literally produce new power but may inject the previously 
consumed power in the grid, aiming to smooth out the negative impact 
of peak loads.  
The actors may undertake a single business role or a combination of multiple 
such activities in the market. For instance, an end-user is a consumer when 
relying on the grid for the operation of its appliances and becomes a provider 
when offering electricity to the grid for the harmonization of the demand. In this 
latter case, this agent is considered as a prosumer, a term that may refer to 
multiple business scenarios. More specifically: 
 A prosumer may be a consumer who does not produce new power but 
participates in a Demand Response (DR) event and accepts to curtail 
her demand during peak hours. 
 A prosumer may also generate power from a small-scale PV 
infrastructure (residential) and inject it (feed in) in the grid. 
 A prosumer may own storage means (e.g. EV Company or residential 
end-user with batteries) and utilize them either for self-consumption or 
for supplying devices of another agent. 
 Any combination of the above cases. 
Additionally, more actors may arise by the combination of the basic roles. For 
example, a retailer may decide to build its own generation plant, aiming to 
reduce its dependency from the fluctuating prices in the wholesale market and 
the consequent risks. In this scenario the resulting role is referred as a pretailer. 
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Additionally, a retailer may decide to undertake aggregation services, aiming to 
take advantage of the existing customer basis.  
Figure 1 does not include a role for the regulator, because this agent does not 
offer a distinct contribution to the composition of a service, but is instead 
responsible for the supervision of the whole system—to guarantee the “level 
playing field,” i.e. that all actors are imposed the same set of rules and have 
access to equal volume of information. The impact of this role may be implicitly 
included in a Business Model Canvas, by means of the entrance barriers due to 
the regulatory framework in the considered market. In the analysis of the 
archetype business models in the next section, we use this business modeling 
canvas approach to illustrate the main components of the business models.  
B. The EU Paradigm—EU Project WiseGRID 
In order to apply our methodology for business modeling analysis and 
generate a number of archetype business models for decentralized energy and 
Smart Grids, we exploited as a paradigm the EU research and innovation project 
WiseGRID.3 WiseGRID, running from November 1, 2016, to April 30, 2020, is 
one of the largest, in terms of funding—with a total cost more than 17 million 
Euros—projects co-funded by the European Commission’s Horizon 2020 work 
program.4 The WiseGRID project provides a set of solutions, technologies, and 
business models, which increase the smartness, stability, and security of an open, 
consumer-centric European energy grid. It also provides cleaner and more 
affordable energy for European citizens through an enhanced use of storage 
technologies, electro-mobility, and a highly increased share of Renewable 
Energy Resources. It aims to deliver the tools and business models that will 
facilitate the creation of an open market and enable all energy stakeholders to 
play an active role toward a democratic energy transition. 
By communicating with the partners participating in the project and with key 
energy stakeholders in the EU region as part of the project’s dissemination 
activities, we were able to extract the necessary information to create a number 
of archetype business models using the methodology described in the previous 
sub-sections, a subset of which we are presenting in this Article. Furthermore, 
as part of project activities these models are currently under implementation (as 
part of project’s pilots) and evaluation. 
 
 3 See generally WISEGRID, supra note 1.  
 4 See generally EUR. COMM’N: HORIZON 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en (last 
visited Feb. 11, 2020). 
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A key element in the business models are the Smart Grid products and 
services that create value for all the involved players. The example products that 
we will refer to in the next Section, developed in WiseGRID are the following, 
as depicted in Figure 2:  
 WG Cockpit is the WiseGRID technological solution targeting DSOs 
and micro grid operators, allowing them to control, manage, and 
monitor their own grid, improving flexibility, stability, and security of 
their network. The main purpose of the WG Cockpit is to enable grid 
operators to manage the fundamental changes that distribution grids are 
facing nowadays, some remarkable ones of those being the transition 
toward a grid with high penetration of distributed renewable energy 
resources and the presence of additional significant loads coming from 
EVs among others. 
 Energy STorage as a Service/Virtual Power Plants (STaaS/VPP) is 
the WiseGRID technological solution targeting VPP Operators who act 
as load aggregators. This tool will make operational a service by which 
consumers/prosumers can easily offer to the market their unused 
storage capacity. Additionally, a complementary embedded service 
allows consumers/prosumers to easily aggregate their spare energy 
generation and offer it to the market in the form of a VPP. 
 WiseEVP is the WiseGRID technological solution addressed to 
electromobility actors to optimize the activities related with smart 
charging and discharging of the EVs including V2G (Vehicle-to Grid) 
and V2B (Vehicle-to Building), striving to utilize their inherent 
flexibility and storage capabilities. 
 FAST Vehicle to the Grid (V2G) is the fast EV charging station, 
which will enable the use of EV as dynamic distributed storage devices, 
feeding electricity stored in their batteries back into the system when 
needed (fast V2G supply). This can help reduce electricity system costs 
by providing a cost-effective means of providing regulation services 
and peak-shaving capacity. 
 WiseCOOP is the WiseGRID technological solution mainly targeted 
toward energy retailers for achieving a balanced portfolio. The tool 
supports retailers by managing demand response campaigns, 
elaborating the energy consuming loads of their existing customers, and 
computing the dynamic price to be applied in the case of a DR event.  
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 WiseCORP is a technological solution targeting businesses, industries, 
ESCOs, and public facilities (consumers and prosumers) with the 
objective of providing them the necessary mechanisms to become 
smarter energy players. By means of energy usage monitoring and 
analysis, proper information can be given to facility managers helping 
them to reduce energy costs and environmental impact. 
 WiseHOME Application informs home residents of their energy 
consumption to raise their awareness regarding the impact of their 
consumption on several aspects, such as cost, emissions, and intra-
cooperative collaboration, and it stimulates their active participation in 
DR campaigns. 
These tools belong in certain market segments serving as examples for purposes 
of our analysis. They can easily be substituted in terms of functionalities found 
in the market today. 
Figure 2: WiseGRID Tools for Smart Grids and Relevant Market Segments 
C. Analysis of Archetype Business Models for a Decentralized Smart Grid 
This Section presents a selection of archetype business models that 
correspond to the different areas to be addressed in Section II. They are 
presented and analyzed using the methodology discussed in Section I, i.e., a 
value network analysis and business modeling canvas. 
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1. Electric Vehicles: Exploiting the Integration of EVs in the Grid  
This Section analyzes the business cases originating from the electrification 
of the transportation sector, i.e., the integration of the EVs and their charging 
infrastructure in the smart grid. The business cases consider an Electric Vehicles 
Supply Equipment Operator (EVSE), managing a charging station and an EV 
fleet manager who owns many EVs and aims to charge them economically, 
meaning that the latter actor undertakes the role of the prosumer. The EV fleet 
manager also owns and operates an EV management platform like the 
WiseGRID WiseEVP tool, which we will use as an example here that considers 
the charging constraints of each individual EV—such as the required charging 
level at a specific time instant—and computes their collective flexibility 
capabilities. 
The EV fleet manager, may use the consumption flexibility to provide DR 
services to the DSO. The DSO may request such services aiming to control the 
power flow at the specific regulation area where the EVSE is located. Multiple 
reasons may trigger such an event including the avoidance of RES production 
curtailment (DR for consumption increase) or the smooth-out of the grid 
congestion (DR for consumption decrease). More specifically, the DR requests 
may refer only to the G2V process where the consumed energy is used to cover 
the needs of the EVs. For instance, part of the DSO’s grid may be congested and 
consequently the DSO will initiate a DR request, aiming to maintain the RES 
production within a specific area closely to the RES. Otherwise, the DSO should 
prevent the RES from injecting power in its grid and consequently should pay 
the relevant compensation to the generators for the curtailment. Alternatively, 
we may consider the case when the distributed RES connected with the grid of 
the DSO produces more than the demand and thus the DSO must pay to the TSO 
the regulated transmission tariffs. 
Aiming to avoid the potential costs, the DSO initiates a DR request to 
increase the local consumption within the regulation area. The DSO requires the 
consumption of a specific volume of energy during a specific time period and 
provides an amount for each consumed unit. It is reasonable to consider that the 
total amount of money offered must be less than the potential costs of the DSO. 
Additional services are possible, including also the V2G process. For instance, 
the DSO may require a bidirectional DR event, i.e., both the consumption of a 
volume of energy but also its injection back to the grid at some specific future 
period (the alternative fuels directive encourages the EU Member States to 
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develop systems which enable EVs to feed power back into the grid).5 Apart 
from the DR services, the DSO may request the provision of ancillary services, 
which may be supported by the EVs’ batteries, such as the voltage regulation 
and frequency control.  
In order to offer services that increase their revenues or decrease their costs, 
the EVSE provider and the prosumers (in our case the EV fleet manager) may 
participate in the value network as members of a Virtual Power Plant. The VPP 
operator bids aggregated bundles of services from EVSE provides (potentially 
along with services from other providers) in the relevant balancing and ancillary 
service markets and offers them part of his revenues (paid by the DSO) for their 
contribution in realizing the requested services. Then, the EVSE may propagate 
to the EV fleet manager lower charging prices during the DR event period and 
the EV fleet manager may reschedule the charging pattern of the EVs (by means 
of the electric vehicle management platform), attempting to reduce his 
operational costs. Alternatively, the business model may consider bilateral 
agreements between the DSO and the EVSE Operator, skipping the intermediary 
role of the VPP Operator. This is feasible because the DSO has knowledge about 
the location of the EVSE infrastructure and may directly request a service from 
the suitable actor who is located at the regulated area of interest. For reasons of 
simplicity, we consider the latter scenario below. All the extra functionalities 
that the EVSEs provide to the smart grid, respect the preferences of the EV user, 
meaning his constraints (e.g. charge required to be completed within a certain 
time frame) will be prioritized in the charging sessions scheduling process. 
Concerning the actor who bears the purchase, installation, and maintenance 
cost of the EVSE infrastructure, the BM assumes a liberalized competitive 
market and consequently considers that the EVSE Operator undertakes this 
investment. For completeness reasons we mention that according to the strategy 
in some Member States, the DSO may lead this investment to stimulate the 
penetration of EVs in the market, while its incurred cost is included in the policy 
of the regulated assets. Once the market develops, the DSO may sell this 
infrastructure to market parties (e.g. via auctions) to cover the remaining cost 
and open the way to competition.  
An extended scenario could also consider owners of a single EV who charge 
them at a public charging station (operated by the EVSE provider) and aim to 
achieve benefits by participating in the aforementioned services. In this case, the 
contractual agreement between the EV Fleet manager (who provides the 
 
 5 Council Directive 2014/94, 2014 O.J. (L 307) 1, 5 (EU). 
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sophistication of the WiseEVP tool) and the owner of the EV must be mutually 
beneficial. For instance, if the vehicle is planned to be charged during a DR event 
(requiring increase of consumption, as described above), then the EV fleet 
manager should receive a payment by its owner for advising this less costly 
schedule, while the latter actor is still favored by the lower prices. In the case 
that the EV participates in the provision of ancillary service (e.g., the frequency 
control), the EV fleet manager should keep a portion of the compensation that 
corresponds to this specific EV, according to its contribution.  
The added value of an EV at the unitary level, e.g., a domestic prosumer 
owning a single EV who charges it with his private EVSE, may be incorporated 
in issues of storage, which investigate the relevant benefits from the batteries’ 
integration and storage in the grid. Indeed, the EV may be considered as a battery 
with intermittent availability, a parameter that may be formulated as a constraint 
in the relevant local-level optimization objectives. 
Finally, we mention that the sophistication of an Electric Vehicle 
management tool like the example WiseEVP may be also utilized when the 
retailer or the DSO propagates dynamic prices to the EVSE Operator. An 
illustrative example is Spain, where a new discriminatory tariff has been 
proposed for promoting the charging of EVs at times of lower demand and lower 
prices.6 In this context, the functionalities of the tool should define the least 
costly charging schedule subject to the above constraints.  
EV usage has continued growing over the past years, according to Electric 
Vehicle Initiative (EVI) Global EV Outlook 2017.7 The EU takes the lead in 
relative numbers of EV per capita, whereas The People’s Republic of China has 
the greatest absolute stock of electric vehicles. The report states that the electric 
car stock will range—with good chance—“between 9 million and 20 million by 
2020 and between 40 million and 70 million by 2025.”8 These numbers are on 
par with the targets of the Paris Agreement on climate change. Nevertheless, 
there are still regulatory and financial obstacles that hinder the higher 
penetration of EVs compared to their conventional counterparts. For instance, in 
Norway and the Netherlands, where EV sales are very high, regulatory 
incentives have played a large role in promoting consumer interest.9 These 
 
 6 COUNCIL OF EUR. ENERGY REGULATORS (CEER), CEER STATUS REVIEW ON EUROPEAN REGULATORY 
APPROACHES ENABLING SMART GRIDS SOLUTIONS, C13-EQS-57-04, at 14, (2014) [hereinafter CEER 2014 
STATUS REVIEW]. 
 7 Int’l Energy Agency, Global EV Outlook 2017: Two Million and Counting, OECD/IEA 2017. 
 8 Id. at 6. 
 9 Paul Hockenos, With Norway in Lead, Europe Set for Surge in Electric Vehicles, YALE ENV’T 360 
(Feb. 6, 2017), http://e360.yale.edu/features/with-norway-in-the-lead-europe-set-for-breakout-on-electric-vehicles); 
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incentives include tax exemptions on EV purchases, one-off grants, and the 
imposition of taxes on fossil fuels. In Belgium, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, and 
the Netherlands, for instance, there is a full registration tax exemption on EV 
Purchases, while Denmark and Finland provide a partial exemption.10 Other 
financial schemes employed by governments are fixed grants, as employed in 
France and Portugal for the replacing of an end-of-life vehicle with a new 
electric vehicle.  
Another barrier is the development and installation of the necessary 
infrastructure (particularly of the charging points) because the new fast charging 
technology is not only expensive to install, but also requires high voltage input 
and therefore the associated consumption fee is high. Governments have also 
taken various actions towards this direction.11 For instance, France has set up a 
special fund for the construction of charging infrastructure, which led to the 
construction of 5,000 charging points in 2015, while in Sweden those individuals 
who installed charging points in their homes obtained a tax reduction for the 
associated labor cost.  
Table 1 below shows a generic business model for integrating EVs in the 
network, and Figure 3 below shows the generic value network for integrating 
EVs in the network. 
Table 1: Generic Business Model for Integrating EVs in the Network in 
Canvas Form 
Actors Involved  Prosumer: EV Fleet Manager 
 EVSE Operator 
 DSO 
Roles Involved   Power consumption (role performed by 
EV Fleet manager by means of the EVs 
that manages). 
 EE & EM Services (role performed by 
EVSE Operator providing the EVSE). 
 Power distribution (role performed by 
DSO through WG Cockpit). 
Value Proposition  EV Fleet Manager 
 His charging preferences will be met. 
 Will provide flexibility to the system 
 
THE INT’L COUNCIL ON CLEAN TRANSP. (ICCT), EUR. VEHICLE MARKET STATISTICS (2015–2016). 
 10 EUR. ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (EEA), ELECTRIC VEHICLES IN EUROPE, No. 20/2016, at 60 (2016). 
 11 Id. at 14. 
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only when he wants to. 
 Will reduce his operational cost by 
utilizing the inherent flexibility 
capabilities and the storage equipment of 
the EVs.  
 
EVSE Operator 
 Will be able to offer more competitive 
prices to its customers (EV fleet 
manager). 
 Will be able to cover the investment on 
EVSE infrastructure sooner. 
DSO 
 Will have additional tools (participation 
in the flexibility market) to operate the 
distribution network. 
 Will improve his quality of supply 
indexes. 
Revenue Streams EV Fleet Manager 
 Will decrease its charging cost by 
utilizing the EVs’ flexibility and shifting 
their consumption during the DR events. 
 Will receive revenues from the 
participation in V2G services, allowing 
(e.g.) the injection of energy from the 
EVs’ batteries in the grid. 
EVSE Operator 
 Will increase its clientele and thus have 
increased revenues for using the EVSE. 
 May receive a portion of the 
compensation provided by the DSO for 
the provision of ancillary service. 
DSO 
 If quality of supply indexes improves, the 
DSO will avoid punishments and 
investment costs for the grid maintenance 
and capacity expansion. 
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Cost Streams EV Fleet Operator  
 Economic investment in software (like 
WiseEVP) and communication channels 
and technologies with the other 
participation tools.  
EVSE Operator 
 Economic investment in the EVSE 
infrastructure. 
DSO 
 Economic investment for the 
development and operation of the 
software (WG Cockpit tool) and 
communication channels and 
technologies with the WiseEVP (via the 
IOP), to send service requests. 
Barriers EV Fleet Manager  
 Limited idle time of the EVs during the 
day to allow dynamic charging or V2G, 
because the batteries of the vehicles take 
long to be fully charged. 
 Idle time of the vehicles is mostly at 
night, thus not many opportunities appear 
to answer grid requests. 
 Rapid aging of batteries if too many 
recharge cycles are applied, leading to 
faster replacement costs. 
EVSE Operator  
 The high investment cost of EVSE may 
cause less than the necessary 
infrastructure in the market and may lead 
to suboptimal utilization of the inherent 
storage capacity. 
 The charging infrastructure requires high 
voltage input, and therefore, it is 
associated with high consumption fees. 
DSO 
 The high purchase price of EVs and their 
limited autonomy, causes their low 
penetration in the market. 
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Figure 3: Generic Value Network for Integrating EVs in the Network 
2. Demand Response: Supply-Demand Balancing by Means of Implicit DR 
Events 
The following identified archetype BM investigates the added value 
provided by an energy aware Demand Response tool (such as the WiseCOOP 
tool) to the retailer, for meeting its obligation of a balanced portfolio by means 
of implicit DR events. Recall that the implicit DR refers to the propagation of 
dynamic prices by the retailer to its clients to incentivize them to reform their 
consumption pattern. Thus, the BM investigates the added value provided by the 
tools that manage the consumption and production of the prosumers at the local 
level, in terms of mitigating the risk of high electricity bills due to their exposure 
in dynamic pricing schemes.  
According to the basic investigated scenario, the retailer handles the 
balancing responsibility on its own, meaning that it also undertakes the role of 
the Balancing Responsible Party (BRP). Focusing on the functionalities of the 
WiseCOOP tool (to be mentioned below), we consider that the retailer/BRP does 
not manage generation units and consequently does not have the option of 
production rescheduling. Thus, a balanced position consists of the equalization 
of its clients’ consumption with the volume of energy purchased (reserved) in 
the wholesale market. In what follows, we consider the case of when the 
retailer’s forecast about the demand of its clients, and consequently, the volume 
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of energy purchased in the day ahead of wholesale market, does not match the 
actual consumption. In the case of a negative imbalance, i.e., when the reserved 
energy is not adequate to cover the actual demand, the retailer/BRP may 
purchase further energy in the intra-day market, but such a choice may be 
particularly costly. In the opposite case, the retailer/BRP must pay an imbalance 
penalty to the TSO for its inaccurate estimation12 
The scenario assumes that the retailers’ customers have already signed 
contracts that expose them to dynamic pricing schemes. In what follows, we 
describe the potential benefits from accepting such an exposure. The retailer’s 
tool may gather all the necessary data from each individual prosumer—by means 
of the communication between the relevant tools—that let this agent know how 
they adapt their consumption with respect to the prices, environmental 
conditions, and social events. The retailer uses this knowledge to compute a 
response with these parameters in mind. Utilizing this information and the 
energy management tool, the retailer is aware of the appropriate level of the 
prices, which should cause the desired collective modification in the demand 
profile of its clients (load shifting/shedding) and will result in a balanced energy 
portfolio. The calculation may either refer to personalized prices for each 
individual client or to common prices for all the members of its clientele.  
The dynamic prices are propagated both to residential prosumers and tertiary 
buildings via the energy management tools. With regard to their operation, the 
basic business scenario considers that it is performed by an ESCO, which 
receives revenue streams as a portion of the prosumer’s bill savings. The BM 
considers prosumers who have installed batteries and may store energy from the 
grid during periods of low prices and consume it when the electricity is more 
expensive. Additionally, the prosumers have installed RES and may compare 
their revenues from the injection of their production in the grid, with the savings 
from a reduced electricity bill if they choose to self-consume/store. In this 
context, the main business role of the ESCO is to provide, by means of the tools 
it manages, the optimal scheduling of the assets at the local level such that the 
revenues of the prosumers are maximized (or their billing cost is minimized), 
always taking into consideration their price sensitivity and their convenience 
constraints or preference. Thus, the tools must present the optimal schedules of 
the assets in a user-friendly way, which will allow the prosumers to easily adopt 
the proposed schedules and understand their potential revenues. Apart from the 
economic incentives, the response of the domestic prosumers to dynamic prices 
may be stimulated by social and ethical parameters, such as the feeling of 
 
 12 KU LEUVEN ENERGY INST., THE CURRENT ELECTRICITY MARKET DESIGN IN EUROPE 3 (2015). 
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working together toward a common purpose and the impact of comparisons and 
competition with other peers of the communities (e.g., neighbors). Such 
functionalities should also be provided by the tools managed by the ESCO to 
stimulate the efficient response of the occupants to the dynamic prices because 
its revenues strongly depend on their consumption rescheduling (being a portion 
of the electricity bill savings). 
From the perspective of the retailer/BRP, this BM exploits the added value 
offered by tools for DR planning like the WiseCOOP tool stemming from better 
demand-side management, in terms of reducing or eliminating the cost that is 
related with an imbalanced portfolio. From the prosumer’s perspective, it 
exploits the added value provided from energy management tools at the 
consumer (e.g. home) level. The added value may be quantified by comparing 
prosumers who follow the optimal schedules provided by the tools’ 
functionality, with those who maintain their flat-fee consumption pattern despite 
the propagation of dynamic prices by the retailer. Additionally, it may be 
quantified by estimating the gains for those prosumers who accept the retailers’ 
favorable contracts. For instance, a candidate contract between the retailer and 
a prosumer may combine a dynamic pricing scheme in the form of critical peak 
pricing during the peak periods, and flat rates for the rest of the time. Then, the 
prosumer may accept such a contract if the level of the flat prices is lower than 
those in a contract that does not include any dynamic scheme. The optimal 
consumption-suggestions of the tools should guarantee that such a choice will 
result in lower electricity bills for the prosumer.  
We clarify that this type of DR event is characterized as implicit, because 
the retailer does not require a specific volume of consumption curtailment but 
provides economic incentives for consumption shifting/shedding via dynamic 
pricing, while the prosumers voluntarily respond to such signals. However, this 
voluntary nature of implicit DR makes the intervention of an ESCO questionable 
and is one of the main barriers for the development of such business models. 
Indeed, the prosumers may not always appropriately shift their consumption 
according to ESCO’s suggestions. As a direct result the anticipated savings in 
the retailer’s bill will not (or partially) be realized and the ESCO will lose its 
source of revenues. To overcome this risk, the business model proposes 
alternative forms of revenue streams for the ESCO. For instance, it could require 
a flat fee from the prosumers for providing its optimal suggestions, along with 
the portion of their bill savings. Additionally, the ESCO should strategically 
choose the suitable subset of prosumers to offer its services, based on an analysis 
of their price sensitivity, which reflects its potential revenues. Nevertheless, the 
revenues of the ESCO may not justify its business role, especially for domestic 
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prosumers whose payback from their participation in the implicit DR events are 
not expected to be noteworthy. To this end, the business model suggests 
alternative options for the commercial exploitation of tools that schedule the 
local assets, such as the WiseHOME and the WiseCORP. For example, in the 
context of the current scenario, the retailer may provide these tools free-of-
charge (or at the price that equals their development cost) to its clients to help 
them participate more efficiently in the implicit DR events, while protecting 
them from their exposure to the dynamic pricing schemes. In this case, the 
retailer objective is not to achieve direct revenues from selling the tools, but 
rather to utilize them for meeting a balanced portfolio, while keeping its clientele 
satisfied by the offered service and preventing them from switching to any of its 
competitors. We emphasize that such services are of importance in a liberalized 
market because the consumers have the right to change their supplier without 
any extra charges. 
Concerning the regulatory barriers, the CEER’s study revealed that seventy-
one percent of the sampled European countries used only static time of use 
tariffs, a pricing scheme which clearly does not provide the field for the implicit 
demand side response to be realized.13 Despite this fact, Time of Use pricing 
schemes appear in countries like Greece, where there are differential tariffs for 
peak and off-peak consumption for residential consumers.14 However, not all 
European States apply “price signals” to induce customers to change their 
consumption patterns. 
From a technical perspective, demand response programs should be made as 
easy as possible for consumers to participate. In addition to concentrating on the 
rewards side of the equation, attention should be devoted also to the cost side; 
consumers will have to invest as little time and effort as possible, so that they 
might engage in demand response even if the financial rewards are not very high 
in absolute terms. In this context, automatization of responses appears to be 
crucial: consumers will not have to do anything because adjustments in their 
consumption patterns will be automatic.  
Finally, it is now well-known, in part, due to studies from the discipline of 
economics, that the efforts of policymakers to empower consumers are often 
frustrated by the fact that consumers do not react to efforts to alter their 
consumption patterns. Ironically, this is because they do not see the financial 
gain as sufficient to reward altering their consumption. In light of this difficulty, 
 
 13 See CEER 2014 Status Review, supra note 6. 
 14 See generally Residential Night Tariff, PPC, https://www.dei.gr/en/oikiakoi-pelates/timologia/oikiako-
timologio-me-xronoxrewsi-oikiako-nuxterino (last visited Feb. 11, 2020). 
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the involved tools must provide additional information apart from the economic 
savings to be achieved, such as the environmental benefits from the reduction of 
the CO2 emissions when shifting the consumption during period of high RES 
generation. Such types of incentives have been observed to stimulate the user’s 
participation in DR events and are considered a major drive for their active 
engagement.15 
Table 2 provides a generic business model for demand response in canvas 
form, and Figure 4 depicts a generic value network for demand response. 
Table 2: Generic Business Model for Demand Response in Canvas Form 
Actors Involved  Prosumer 
 Retailer 
 ESCO/(EE&EM) 
Roles Involved   Power Consumption & Production, Energy 
Storage (role performed by domestic and 
tertiary prosumers). 
 EE and EM Services (role performed by the 
ESCO, which manages the functionalities of 
the WiseHOME and WiseCORP tools). 




Involved Actors  
Prosumer 
 A prosumer who participates in the implicit 
DR events may negotiate favorable contracts 
with the retailer (as described above). 
 Prosumers who have installed RES and 
generate electricity can utilize self-balancing 
to generate added value through the 
difference in the prices of buying, generating, 
and selling electricity. 
 Prosumers who have installed batteries in 
their households/premises may adapt their 
electricity consumption profiles according to 
the dynamic prices with a lower 
inconvenience cost and utilize to higher 
extent renewable energy sources. 
 Will be able to follow more accurately the 
optimal schedules by means of their 
visualization, while they remain within their 
 
 15 SMART ENERGY DEMAND COALITION, MAPPING DEMAND RESPONSE IN EUROPE TODAY 27 (2015). 
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comfort zone. 
Retailer 
 Implicit DR enables retailers to adjust their 
portfolio demand profile so that it better 
matches the profile of energy purchased from 
the wholesale energy markets, therefore 
reducing chances of imbalance (the value 
proposition considered in this BM). 
 Retailers can employ dynamic pricing tariffs, 
such as time of use, critical-peak pricing, and 
real-time pricing to better represent market 
prices, expose consumers to the real 
electricity cost, and raise their awareness (out 
of scope). 
 Retailers can use load flexibility, through 
dynamic prices, to reduce peak demand, and 
benefit from stability in the network.  
ESCO 
 Energy Service Companies can benefit from 
the dynamic supply/demand interplay by 
offering suitable services to prosumers and 
retailers, such as forecasting information and 
prediction models, remote maintenance and 
support, and onsite or offsite energy 
management. 
 Energy cost management or tariff 
comparison, can be offered by ESCOs to 
facility managers and/or residential 
consumers, opening up new lines of business. 
Revenue Streams Prosumer 
 Reduced electricity bill by means of load 
shifting/shedding and the use of batteries. 
 Better utilization of RES by comparing the 
consumption prices (retailer) with the 
potential revenues from grid injection to 
make the optimal decision: either self-
consume or sell.  
Retailer 
 Reduced cost or penalties due to its portfolio 
imbalance (main source). 
 Dynamic tariff schemes and related enhanced 
information services can increase the supplier 
market share via consumer engagement and 
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improved brand image.  
ESCO 
 Revenues for providing the sophistication of 
the energy management tool’s functionalities. 
Their revenues are a portion of the electricity 
bill reduction combined if necessary, with a 
flat fee.  
Cost Streams Prosumer  
 Part of their savings are given to the ESCO 
for providing the optimal consumption and 
RES generation schedules. 
Retailer 
 Economic investment for the development 
and operation of the software for the DR 
planning tool, communication channels, and 
technologies with the energy management 
tools. 
ESCO 
 Economic investment for the development 
and operation of the software for the energy 
management tools and communication 
channels and technologies with the DR 
planning tool.  
 Potential charges paid to prosumers and/or 
aggregators for not providing suitable 
services and/or accurate information.  
Barriers Prosumer  
 The insufficient economic benefits from their 
participation on implicit DR programs. 
 The lack of information about the further 
benefits achieved by the DR programs, such 
as the environmental ones, that would 
strongly stimulate the active participation of 
the environmental-sensitive individuals. 
 The lack of automation equipment that would 
make their engagement in DR programs more 
convenient. 
Retailer 
 The absence of dynamic pricing schemes in 
the member states, and the lack of incentives 
for the prosumers that reduce the portion of 
the retailer’s clientele that would opt into 
such programs. 
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ESCO 
 The prosumers’ reactions to the dynamic 
prices and the adoption of the ESCO’s 
suggestions are on a volunteer basis, and thus 
the revenues of this actor (as a portion of the 
electricity bill savings) become questionable. 
Figure 4: Generic Value Network for Demand Response 
3. Storage: Prosumers-Driven Energy Storage Integration 
This Section analyzes business cases and potential business models driven 
by the integration of energy storage systems at the prosumers’ premises, in either 
domestic or tertiary buildings and focusing on the added value of services that 
may arise from their utilization. Our analysis clusters the services according to 
the level of their implementation, a parameter which also determines the 
involved actors. On the local level, the batteries are used to optimize the 
revenues of a single prosumer, while on the aggregation level the VPP Operator 
(aggregator) pools the storage capabilities of multiple individual prosumers, 
targeting to offer more demanding (in terms of storage capacity) services to 
further actors of the smart grid, such as the DSO.  
More specifically, on the prosumer level the integration of batteries can 
result in consumption patterns which are less dependent on variable energy 
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prices. For instance, the prosumer may be exposed to dynamic prices propagated 
by the retailer (either time-of-use or real-time schemes). Then, the storage unit 
operation may be scheduled according to the prices’ fluctuations; charged when 
energy prices are low and discharged when energy prices are high. As a result, 
the prosumer may achieve a reduced retailer’s bill, while limiting the impact of 
consumption shifting on his convenience preference. An extended scenario (still 
on local level), may consider a prosumer who has also installed RES on his 
rooftop. In this situation, the prosumer may decide the most profitable strategy, 
in terms or revenues maximization: (1) either store the self-production to meet 
his own future needs; or (2) inject it in the grid and receive the relevant payment. 
The monitoring and configuration of storage units at the prosumer level will be 
mainly supported by the ESCO which owns and operates tools for energy 
management (like the WiseHOME and WiseCORP tools), for residential and 
tertiary buildings. According to the basic business model, these companies 
receive a portion of the prosumers’ savings or profits, as a revenue for the 
provided services.  
The individual prosumers may achieve additional benefits from installed 
storage systems, by their collective participation in a Virtual Power Plant (VPP). 
The VPP Operator bids in the ancillary and balancing markets for services 
requested by the DSO, which contribute to the smooth operation of the grid. 
Such services may be frequency-control, reactive power and voltage control, 
back-up service, and peak shaving for grid congestion management. The VPP 
Operator aims to expand its portfolio with prosumers owning batteries, because 
such members may participate more actively in DR events and more importantly 
are necessary for provisioning a subset of the aforementioned services. To this 
end, the VPP Operator must invest in the communication, metering and control 
infrastructure needed for the data collection from the batteries and use such data 
as input for developing sophisticated algorithms for their scheduling in the 
market participation. Furthermore, the VPP Operator collects data by means of 
energy management tools from the markets related to the requests for services 
provisioning. Then, the VPP Operator combines these types of data, in order to 
decide the most profitable utilization of its assets. More specifically, when the 
VPP Operator receives simultaneous requests for multiple services, the 
algorithms of the software/tool that manages the storage-as-a-service (like the 
WG STaaS/VPP tool) determines which batteries (prosumers) should participate 
in each one. This decision is based both on the batteries’ characteristics, such as 
their availability and cost functions with respect to their aging and losses and on 
the forecast of the local production and consumption such that the prosumers’ 
convenience preferences are not violated. On the aggregation level, the VPP 
Operator allocates the monetary amount paid by the DSO to its customers 
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according to their contribution in the service realization, while keeping a 
reasonable portion for its own services. Additionally, the VPP Operator may 
gain revenues by requiring a participation fee from his members. Also, in this 
scenario, the ESCO suggests the optimal consumption patterns at the local level, 
to satisfy the request of the VPP Operator, and receives a portion of the offered 
compensation for its services. 
For all the preceding services, the BM may capture two alternatives with 
respect to the batteries’ ownership. The former assumes that the prosumer pays 
and owns the batteries—i.e., the batteries are considered as a capex cost for this 
actor. In this situation, the BM will compute the added revenues that the 
prosumer attains through the batteries due to increased economic coverage of 
his own needs and active participation in ancillary services—compared to a 
consumer who does not own batteries. The added revenues should exceed the 
initial investment—the cost of purchasing and installing the batteries—within a 
reasonable time interval in order of years and provide income to the prosumers 
thereafter, till the end of their lifecycle. 
The second case considers an additional actor in the value chain, namely 
Storage Unit Operator (SUO), who bears the capex cost of the batteries and 
installs them at the prosumers’ premises, aiming to offer storage services. This 
actor may allocate only a portion of the batteries’ capacity for meeting the 
prosumer’s needs and his revenue-maximization strategies at the local level, 
while the rest may be assigned for providing services that are requested by the 
VPP Operator. For its former contribution, this actor may receive revenues in 
the same form as for the ESCOs which manage the energy management tools, 
i.e., it exploits a portion of the added value created for the prosumers due to the 
batteries’ presence. In this case, the contractual agreement between the two 
parties must explicitly specify the portion of the batteries’ capacity which is 
associated with local needs. Because its revenue streams are identical with those 
of the ESCO, in what follows we assume for simplicity reasons that the ESCO 
undertakes also the role of the SUO. 
This business model may be extended to investigate the added value gained 
by prosumers from the integration of EVs, due to their inherent storage 
capabilities. The main difference with a conventional battery is both its capacity 
limitations and its availability when needed to perform the services discussed 
above—with the latter strongly dependent on the prosumer’s lifestyle pattern. 
The EV primarily consumes enough electricity to cover the threshold of its own 
transportation needs and supply for secondary devices. Thus, the EV is expected 
to significantly increase the consumption of the households. As a result, the role 
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of the ESCO in this case is even more crucial to provide the optimal consumption 
schedules according to the varying prices within the planning horizon, while also 
meeting the other objectives at the local (V2H) and aggregation (V2G) levels as 
described above. 
Concerning the regulatory barriers for the implementation of the 
aforementioned business models, this Section focuses on those related with the 
installation of the storage units and briefly mentions those which refer to the 
operation of the VPP Operator. More specifically, the regulation of storage 
assets faces many conceptual and practical challenges since there is no 
consensus on the definition of storage assets. Particularly, whether storage assets 
should be treated as generation assets or consumption units. This lack of clarity 
stems from the fact that, while storage assets can generate electricity in the literal 
sense of “generation,” the amount of electricity generated is typically not enough 
to provide a net positive flow to the electricity system.16 On the other hand, 
storage assets cannot be properly classified as consumption units because they 
do not actually consume the energy that they take up. Could they also be 
classified as part of a transmission or distribution network, given that they can 
be a bridge asset between generators and final consumers? The answers to these 
questions are fundamental to the development of an appropriate regulatory 
regime as they impact on inter alia ownership, pricing and the imposition taxes 
and levies.  
For instance, in Spain, under the Electricity Sector Law 24/2013, battery 
owners are not allowed to reduce the maximum power they have under contract 
with their supplier.17 While it may be argued that this policy is intended to 
maintain grid integrity, when coupled with the high self-consumption tax, the 
regulatory regime for self-consumption and storage appears to be ill-considered. 
In some cases, the regulatory framework not only does not promote, but rather, 
hinders the development of storage. For example, in some countries taxation is 
not favorable to storage, as typified by the “Grid Fee System.”18 Ordinarily, grid 
fees are paid by the final consumers of power, as a fee for the transportation of 
electricity through the grid network. In the case of storage, operators of storage 
assets are first charged for charging the storage asset and then also for 
discharging it, because of the notional double flow of electricity. In real terms, 
the storage asset is neither a producer nor consumer. Therefore, the strict 
 
 16 Giorgio Castagneto et al., Regulatory Barriers to Energy Storage Deployment: The UK Perspective, 
2016 RESTLESS PROJECT 1, 2. 
 17 See generally B.O.E. n. 310, Dec. 27, 2013 (Spain). 
 18 See Sören Amelang, Power Grid Fees—Unfair and Opaque?, CLEAN ENERGY WIRE (Jan. 26, 2017), 
https://www.cleanenergywire.org/factsheets/power-grid-fees-unfair-and-opaque. 
LEAL-ARCASETALPROOFS_3.25.20 5/3/2020 12:22 PM 
462 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34 
application of the traditional grid fee model should not extend to storage assets. 
Often, this double taxation is higher than power prices, resulting in a very strong 
dis-incentivization of electricity storage.19 
Finally, concerning the operation of the VPP aggregator, there are generally 
no standardized contractual arrangements governing the roles and 
responsibilities of this distinct actor. Furthermore, it is often impossible in 
practice, or even not allowed by the law, to aggregate consumers’ flexibility. 
Even though in some countries demand response is a commercially viable 
product, remaining a key obstacle is the requirement for aggregators to get the 
prior agreement of the customer’s supplier/balancing responsible party—needed 
in order to be able to contract with the customer.20 
Table 3 below is a generic business model description for prosumers-driven 
energy storage integration in canvas form. Figure 5 offers a generic value 
network for prosumers driven energy storage integration. 
Table 3: Generic Business-Model Description for Prosumers-Driven 
Energy Storage Integration in Canvas Form 
Roles Involved   Power consumption and production (role 
performed by domestic / tertiary consumer with 
installed RES units). 
 Energy Storage (role performed by prosumer with 
batteries or by the ESCO acting also as “Storage 
Unit Operator”). 
 EE & EM Services (role performed by the ESCO 
which operates the functionalities of the energy 
management tools). 
 Power distribution (role performed by the DSO). 





 Will be able to increase its self-consumption.  
 Will be less dependent to the fluctuations of the 
retail prices and thus will reduce his electricity 
bill. 
 Will be able to meet its energy demand at all 
times. 
 
 19 Jason Deign, Spain’s New Self-Consumption Law Makes Batteries Impractical for Homeowners, 
GREENTECH MEDIA (Oct. 16, 2015), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/spanish-self-consumption-
law-allows-batteries-at-a-cost. 
 20 SMART ENERGY DEMAND COALITION, supra note 15, at 55. 
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 Will be able to monitor its own production and 
consumption.  
 Will be able to provide services to the VPP 
Operator (aggregator) and thus generate 
additional income. 
ESCO  
 Will be able to offer new and better services to its 
clients, by the more efficient utilization of their 
flexibility and self-production. 
 Acting also as SUO, will be able to provide 
multiple services (even at the same time) and thus 
generate additional income streams. 
 Will increase its customers and its penetration in 
the market. 
DSO 
 Will be able to use storage units for grid services. 
 Will be able to react fast on situations occurring 
in the grid through low response times of storage 
units. 
 Will be able to locally solve grid congestions. 
 Will profit from grid investment deferral when 
storage units are deployed in a larger scale.  
VPP Operator 
 Will be able to provide services and flexibility to 
the market and thus generate additional income. 




Prosumer (consumer with batteries and RES) 
 Reduction of the energy bill through time-of use 
management and enhanced self-consumption. 
 Additional revenues from its more active 
participation in DR events, and other services that 
require the batteries installation. 
ESCO 
 Receive a portion of the prosumers’ revenues for 
providing the energy management service 
(optimal batteries scheduling at the local level). 
 Acting also as SUO, receives a portion of the 
prosumers’ revenues for providing the storage 
capabilities and gains additional income from the 
VPP Operator for its contribution in DR events 
and ancillary services. 
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DSO 
 Lower cost and thus higher profit through grid 
investment deferral when storage units are 
deployed or pooled in a larger scale.  
VPP Operator 
 Payment received by the DSO (or other actors) 
for providing ancillary services and flexibility to 
the relevant markets. 
 Receives participation fee from the prosumers 
who aim to become members of the VPP. 
Cost Streams Prosumer (consumer with batteries and RES) 
 The investment cost for buying and installing the 
batteries.  
 A portion of the achieved added value (revenues 
for participating in DR events and offering 
ancillary services, or decreased electricity bill of 
the retailer) is given to the ESCO for its services 
provision. 
 Participation fee to the VPP Operator. 
ESCO  
 Initial economic investment on software and 
communication channels and technologies with a 
storage-as-a-service management tool like the 
WG STaaS/VPP.  
 Acting also as SUO, bears the capex cost of the 
storage equipment and the relevant monitoring 
and control devices. 
DSO 
 Initial economic investment on software and 
communication channels and technologies with a 
storage-as-a-service management tool like the 
WG STaaS/VPP.  
VPP Operator 
 Initial economic investment on software for 
developing the storage-as-a-service management 
tool, and for communication channels and 
technologies with the energy management tools 
like WiseHOME and WiseCORP.  
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Barriers Prosumer 
 The regulatory framework may not allow the 
potential savings to appear and consequently 
hinder the development of storage (e.g., the Spain 
case, where the battery owners are not allowed to 
reduce the maximum power under contract with 
their retailer).21 
 Regulatory provisions may render business model 
non-profitable, e.g., by maintaining network 
charges on storage (charged for the double flow 
of electricity). 
ESCO 
 Acceptance of dynamic prices is rather low 
around the EU.22 Consumer’s reluctance to join 
such programs is prevalent. Such conditions do 
not bring about the potential savings in the 
electricity bill, therefore the engagement of the 
ESCO becomes questionable. 
 Uncertainty about inherent demand flexibility 
available in various building typologies and 
housed activities/operations. 
VPP Operator 
 Not clear regulatory definition of the role, rights, 
obligations, function of Aggregator in all 
European countries. 
 Not an extended scaling up of advanced smart 
meters enabling fast response to DR requests. 
DSO 
 All the barriers reported for the other participating 
actors affects also the potential of the DSO to 
request DR and ancillary services that may be 





 21 See generally B.O.E. n. 310, Dec. 27, 2013 (Spain). 
 22 See Geert De Clereq, Run Your Dishwasher When the Sun Shines: Dynamic Power Pricing Grows, 
REUTERS (Aug. 2, 2018, 2:53 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-electricity-prices-insight/run-
your-dishwasher-when-the-sun-shines-dynamic-power-pricing-grows-idUSKBN1KN0L7. 
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Figure 5: Generic Value Network for Prosumers Driven Energy Storage 
Integration 
4. Archetype BM for Exploiting Prosumers Flexibility—The Role of a 
Virtual Power Plant  
The archetype BM in this Section investigates the added value to be gained 
by the participating actors in an explicit DR event. Central role in the BM has 
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the Virtual Power Plant (VPP) which represents a basic component of an 
interactive and dynamic distribution network, as a system that integrates many 
resources, such as RES, energy storage systems, and flexible/controllable loads 
of domestic and tertiary prosumers. According to the basic business scenario, at 
the local level (for each individual household or tertiary building) these 
resources are scheduled by the responsible ESCOs to regulate energy 
management tools at the home and building level, like the WiseGRID, 
WiseHOME, and WiseCORP tools, to optimally meet the needs of the 
occupants. At the aggregation level, the production capacity and consumption 
flexibility of these heterogeneous resources can be pooled, and the energy 
surplus can be utilized to offer additional services. In that sense, the VPP 
Operator acts as an aggregator and represents an intermediary between the 
prosumer and energy markets, while its business role consists in identifying the 
most profitable utilization of VPP resources. 
More specifically, the VPP Operator can participate in Day-Ahead and 
Intraday wholesale markets for selling the energy surplus and in the Balancing 
markets for offering consumption flexibility and DR services to other actors of 
the grid, e.g., the DSO.23 Aiming to maximize the revenues of its participants 
while satisfying their convenience constraints, the VPP Operator first selects—
by means of the WiseCORP and WiseHOME tools—the forecasts of the local 
RES production and combines it with the forecasted demand of its members 
aiming to compute their surplus. Then, the VPP Operator compares the potential 
revenues from the two markets and decides the most profitable schedule for its 
assets: either sell the consumption surplus or store it to cover future local needs. 
Additionally, the VPP Operator computes the most profitable schedule of 
each individual VPP member’s resources. The VPP Operator’s tool (such as 
the WG STaaS/VPP) sends these optimal strategies to each individual prosumer, 
using the communication channels and the relevant tools. 
In the case of a DR event, the VPP Operator explicitly requests from a subset 
of its members their consumption shifting/shedding of a specific volume of 
power within a specific time duration. For instance, the DSO may request the 
self-consumption (or storage) of the RES production to avoid a curtailment, or 
a consumption shift that would relieve its grid from congestion. Depending on 
the VPP Operator’s contracts with its members, the VPP Operator may offer a 
payment for the consumption rescheduling or may apply direct load control. In 
the former case, the VPP Operator first chooses the most appropriate prosumers 
 
 23 See e.g., Day-Ahead and Real-Time Energy Markets, ISO: NEW ENGLAND, https://www.iso-ne.com/ 
markets-operations/markets/da-rt-energy-markets/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2020).  
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to participate in the DR event, according to their potential in satisfying the DR 
requirements and the level of compensation they request. The DR signal along 
with the payment level is sent to the WiseCORP tool, which computes the 
optimal rescheduling of the local devices. In the case of direct load control, the 
VPP Operator computes and sends the optimal schedules for the devices in the 
tertiary building, while the role of the WiseCORP tool is limited to their 
implementation. In both schemes, the participation of the prosumers in the DR 
is quantified by comparing their actual consumption during the event with their 
individual baselines—consumption under normal conditions, in the absence of 
DR request—which are derived by elaborating historical data. The VPP 
Operator manages the compensations for its members according their 
involvement and contribution to demand response campaigns and the energy 
surplus provided. Concerning his revenue stream, the VPP Operator may require 
a participation fee from each individual member and keep a portion of their 
profits from their participation in the wholesale markets and the DR events.  
Ultimately, the aim of this BM is to investigate the added value gained by 
the prosumers from their participation in the VPP, due to the more efficient 
utilization of their production and consumption-shifting capabilities both at local 
and aggregation level, according to the advice of the VPP Operator. As 
mentioned above, the additional potential revenues will be gained by purchasing 
their production surplus in the wholesale market (compared e.g., with the 
regulated feed-in tariffs or premiums for the participation of small-scale 
producers below 10KW in the markets) and by participating in DR events. 
Furthermore, this BM investigates the added value that will be provided by the 
WG STaaS/VPP tool to the VPP Operator. The potential additional revenues are 
expected to be realized mainly due to the optimization functionalities of the tool, 
which allow the agent to decide the optimal assignment of the requested services 
to its assets and consequently increase the set of services that may be offered 
(e.g. increase the magnitude of demand shifting that the VPP Operator can offer 
in the balancing market). Additionally, the optimal advice given to the 
prosumers is expected to extend its clientele (more prosumers willing to become 
members of the VPP) and thus its revenues. In this context, it becomes apparent 
the crucial importance of the VPP Operator’s tool for his viable business 
activity. More specifically, its sophistication must result to the real-time optimal 
assignment of the VPP assets among the alternatives that arise in the wholesale 
market (energy selling or DR participation). In this way, the VPP Operator will 
be able to offer competitive bids to the DSO and achieve increased gains for its 
members, a fact that results in an extended portfolio and higher market share. 
The role of the ESCO in these scenarios is aligned with those in the other BMs—
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i.e., to reschedule the consumption of the devices at the local level—such that 
the consumption pattern communicated by the VPP Operator is met.  
For clarity, this archetype BM assumes that the prosumers own the RES. 
Nevertheless, the BM and the relevant value network may be appropriately 
modified to include also the case when a RESCO owns and operates the RES, 
when this parameter is clarified in the pilot sites. The relevant contracts must be 
carefully designed to resolve conflicting interests between the involved parties. 
Such issues may arise in the case of a contract between a consumer and the 
RESCO (renting his/her rooftop), which specifies the portion of generation that 
may be consumed locally on an hourly basis. Then, if the VPP Operator require 
from the consumer an explicit DR lasting for a shorter interval (e.g., half an 
hour), the prosumer may require from the RESCO to consume all the agreed 
portion of the local generation during the event, aiming to avoid the 
inconvenience cost while earning the compensation by the VPP Operator. This 
action may be against the interests of the RESCO if the wholesale price is high 
at the same time, because it misses the opportunity to maximize the profits from 
its generation. 
Concerning the barriers that may prevent such BMs to be realized, we 
distinguish between the technical and legislative perspective. As for the 
technical perspective, many European countries lack a standardized framework 
for the measurement of the baseline consumption. Which, as mentioned above, 
is considered as a comparison benchmark for the quantification of the load 
shifting/shedding during the DR event. Consequently, there may be an 
inaccurate estimation of the consumer’s contribution. Thus, inadequate payment 
for offering their flexibility, which clearly results in weak incentives for 
participants. Furthermore, the business activity of the aggregator strongly 
depends on the installation of certain infrastructures for real-time 
communication of data and the automation of consumption rescheduling. The 
key intuition here is to install smart meters, which are not yet deployed in most 
EU Member States.24 
Considering the legislative perspective, in many Member States aggregated 
demand response is either illegal or its development is seriously hindered due to 
regulatory barriers. Indeed, load aggregators are not present in every EU 
Member State.25 The analogous consideration applies to regulatory frameworks 
 
 24 See Frédéric Simon, Smart Meter Woes Hold Back Digitalisation of EU Power Sector, EURACTIV 
(Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/smart-meter-woes-hold-back-digitalisation-of-
eu-power-sector/. 
 25 See generally Paolo Bertoldi, et. al, JRC Science for Policy Report: Demand Response Status in EU 
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governing their operation. In Italy, “the notion of load aggregator is not formally 
recognized and no regulatory framework currently exists.”26 Poland does not 
seem to be taking the required steps to foster the development of incentive-based 
(explicit) demand response.27  
Other European countries still present important regulatory barriers, notably 
program participation requirements not yet tailored for both generation and 
demand-side resources. For example, Austria requires consumers “to install a 
secured and dedicated telephone line to participate in the balancing market.”28 
Norway requires TSO signals to be sent over the phone, which makes the 
minimum bid-size high.29 As a result, the participation of consumers other than 
large industrial consumers is hindered. Similarly, technical and organizational 
rules do not consider some of the requirements for the provision of balancing 
services in sufficient detail. Such as the negative impact of complex and lengthy 
approval procedures, and their associated costs, on market entry and 
participation. 
Great Britain is deemed to have competitive energy markets and open 
balancing markets, though uncertainties for demand response have been cast by 
the emerging capacity market.30 Great Britain was the first EU Member State to 
open many of its electricity markets to the demand side of things.31 Currently all 
balancing markets allow the participation of demand response in general and 
aggregated load in particular.32 However, according to the SEDC, 
“measurement, baseline, bidding and other procedural and operational 
requirements are inappropriate for demand-side resources[.]”33 Thus, even 
though the markets are formally open, in practice, results in terms of demand-
side participation have been worsening over time. Furthermore, the capacity 
remuneration mechanism introduced in 2014 is said not to place demand-side 
resources on a “level playing field” with generation resources.34 Indeed, only 
 
Member States (2016)). 
 26 RAFAEL LEAL-ARCAS, SOLUTIONS FOR SUSTAINABILITY: HOW THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE, ENERGY, 
AND CLIMATE CHANGE REGIMES CAN HELP 378 (citing Paolo Bertoldi, et. al, supra note 25, at 69).  
 27 SMART ENERGY DEMAND COALITION, supra note 15, at 10–11.  
 28 Id. at 10.  
 29 Id.  
 30 Id. at 150.  
 31 See id. at 85.  
 32 See id.  
 33 Id.  
 34 See id. at 167.  
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one demand-side aggregator out of around fifteen operating in the market 
managed to secure a contract in the first capacity market auction.35 
In Spain, even though some smart grid pilot projects are currently being 
developed, incentive-base (explicit) demand response is currently modest.36 
Even though there is one interruptible load program that allows incentive-based 
(explicit) demand response, the scheme is only open to large consumers and has 
not been used for several years.37 Importantly, load aggregation is illegal.38  
Finally, even though load aggregators exist in some countries, such as France 
and Belgium, at the moment their activities are focused on the high and medium 
voltage levels of the transmission grid meaning that they only deal with the 
TSOs.39 Clearly their business interaction must be extended also with the DSOs, 
aiming to contribute to the proper operation of the grid at the low voltage level 
(distribution). 
Table 4 provides a generic business model description for exploiting 
prosumers’ flexibility and Figure 6 below offers a generic value network for 
prosumers driven energy storage integration. 
Table 4: Generic Business Model Description for Exploiting Prosumers’ 
Flexibility 
Actors Involved  Prosumer  
 ESCO 
 VPP operator  
 DSO 
Roles Involved   Power Consumption / Production and Energy 
Storage: (role performed by either domestic or 
tertiary consumer with batteries and RES 
installed). 
 Aggregator Services (role performed by the 
VPP Operator managing the WG STaaS / VPP 
tool). 
 EE & EM Services (role performed by the 
ESCO, managing the energy management 
tools like WiseGRID’s WiseHOME and 
WiseCORP). 
 
 35 Id. at 85.  
 36 Id. at 131. 
 37 See id. at 79.  
 38 Id. at 10, 41, 45, 47, 68, 85, 131, 151. 
 39 See id. at 72; see also id. at 155. 
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 Power Distribution (role performed by the 
DSO, managing the WG Cockpit tool for 
sending the DR requests). 
Value Proposition  Prosumer 
 Will be able to schedule its consumption, 
production, and storage capabilities more 
efficiently. 
 Will be able to sell its production surplus to 
the wholesale market. 
 Will receive additional revenues from its 
flexibility capabilities and its participation in 
explicit DR events. 
 Will have the opportunity to give its 
contribution for the environment protection, 
when participating in explicit DR events for 
the RES curtailment avoidance.  
ESCO 
 Will decide the optimal schedules of the 
devices at the local level and thus increase its 
revenues (as a portion of the prosumer’s 
profits). 
VPP Operator  
 Will provide a combination of services, thus 
utilizing more efficiently the assets of its 
members. 
 Will provide optimal schedules and thus 
increase its clientele. 
 Will manage better its internal resources in 
order to decide more efficiently if it is more 
profitable to store or sell the energy surplus. 
 Will be able to provide explicit DR services, 
thus increasing its earning.  
DSO 
 Will be able to receive in an easier way 
support for balancing the grid by means of the 
DR services provided by VPP operators. 
Revenue Streams Prosumer 
 Payments from the aggregator for its 
contribution in the explicit DR events. 
VPP Operator  
 Revenues for operating as an intermediary 
between the prosumers and the energy markets 
(receives a portions of the prosumers’ profits). 
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 Revenues for providing DR services to the 
DSO. 
 Receives a flat fee from the prosumers for 
their participation in the VPP. 
EE&EM 
 Revenues for providing the sophistication of 
the energy management tools’ functionalities. 
Their revenues may be either a portion of the 
compensation provided to prosumers for their 
participation in explicit DR events, or a fixed 
fee paid by the prosumers (or their 
combination). 
DSO 
 Decreased operational costs by avoiding the 
grid congestion and RES curtailment. 
Cost Streams Prosumer 
 Part of its revenues will be given to the ESCO 
for the optimal schedule of the local devices.  
 Payment to the VPP Operator for becoming a 
member of the VPP.  
VPP Operator  
 Economic investment for the development and 
operation of the software (such as the WG 
STaaS/VPP tools) and communication 
channels and technologies with the 
WiseHOME/WiseCORP and WG Cockpit 
tools, aiming to receive and send flexibility 
requests and compute the optimal schedules at 
aggregation level. 
 Payments to VPP participants for their 
involvement in the DR services realization and 
for their power production. 
 Payments to the market’s operator for market 
participation (not appearing in the value 
network). 
ESCO 
 Economic investment for the development and 
operation of the software tools for energy 
management and communication channels and 
technologies with the WG STaaS/VPP, aiming 
to receive flexibility requests and compute the 
optimal schedules at local level. 
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DSO 
 Economic investment for the development and 
operation of the software (like the WG 
Cockpit tool), and communication channels 
and technologies with the WG STaaS/ VPP, 
aiming to send flexibility requests. 
 Payment to the VPP Operator for provisioning 
the DR services.  
Barriers  Prosumer 
 The lack of a standardized framework for the 
measurement of the baseline consumption and 
the inadequate installed equipment (smart 
meters) prevent the revenues from their 
contribution in DR events to be realized and 
hinder their active participation in such 
programs. 
VPP Operator 
 The same barriers as mentioned above for the 
prosumer. 
 The regulatory barriers in many member 
states, where the aggregation of small loads is 
illegal, or do not guarantee a level playing 
field for the competitive participation of the 
aggregators in the balancing markets. 
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Figure 6: Generic Value Network for Prosumers Driven Energy Storage 
Integration 
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II. UNITED KINGDOM 
A. Overview 
This Section enumerates the energy strategy, policy framework and 
regulatory architecture underpinning the United Kingdom’s smart grid 
transition. It will further analyze the progress that the UK has made against its 
own strategic objectives in light of the WiseGRID project’s principal aim to: 
contribute to the energy sector new technologies and solutions for the 
improvement of the smartness, stability, and security of the European energy 
grid. In the hopes of further stimulating this discussion, this Section will 
conclude by evaluating the UK’s responses to the challenges that have arisen 
during its transition process. 
The UK has set a series of targets for renewable energy. By 2020, the UK 
wants to derive 15% of its energy consumption from renewable energy sources. 
It has set individual targets for electricity (30%), heat (12%), and transport 
(10%).40 It has also set an ambitious energy savings target, attempting to reduce 
its final energy consumption by 18% compared to 2007 levels.41 Finally, the UK 
has committed to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 80% by 2050, 
compared to 1990 levels.42 
The UK has made great strides towards weaning itself off its traditional, 
coal-based energy industries. The nuclear industry remains a central plank of the 
UK’s energy strategy and is set to play a key role in the provision of clean, 
reliable energy to meet future demand. A number of nuclear projects are 
currently in the development pipeline.43 Renewable energy also plays an 
important role, particularly in Scotland.44 Controversially, however, the UK is a 
proponent of hydraulic fracking: the drilling for shale gas.45 The re-
 
 40 DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE, NATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY ACTION PLAN FOR 
THE UNITED KINGDOM: ARTICLE 4 OF THE RENEWABLE ENERGY DIRECTIVE 2009/28/EC, at 5 (UK) [hereinafter 
DECC 2010]. 
 41 DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE, UK NATIONAL ENERGY EFFICIENCY ACTION PLAN, 
DECC, at 87 (UK) [hereinafter DECC 2014]. 
 42 Climate Change Act 2008, c.27, §1 (Eng.). 
 43 See generally John Parnell, Momentum Builds for UK Government to Self-Fund New Nuclear Plants, 
GTM (Jan. 15, 2020), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/momentum-builds-for-uk-government-to-
fund-new-nuclear-itself.  
 44 See Sophie Hirsh, Scotland’s New Target: 100% Renewable Electricity in 2020, WORLD ECON. FORUM, 
(July 17, 2019), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/07/scotland-wind-energy-new-record-putting-country-
on-track-for-100-renewable-electricity-in-2020/. 
 45 See What is Fracking and Why is it Controversial, BBC NEWS (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/ 
news/uk-14432401. 
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commencement of operations in 2018 is at odds with its efforts to reduce carbon 
output. 
The UK considers itself a leader in the green transition, and it has made solid 
progress towards many of its targets. In 2017, the UK saw renewable energy’s 
share of electricity generation jump to 29.3%.46 With the UK now comfortably 
producing one quarter of its electricity from renewables, the overall target of 
15% of its consumption from renewables seems increasingly achievable. 
Primary energy consumption fell by 15% and final energy consumption by 11% 
in 2015, compared to 2007.47 By 2017, UK emissions were 43% below 1990 
levels.48  
Notwithstanding its progress, there is widespread acknowledgement that 
efforts must accelerate if the UK is to reach its targets. There are particular 
concerns about a downward trend in green investment. The withdrawal of 
governmental support at a time of considerable market uncertainty appears to 
have compounded investor uncertainty.49 A hostile planning environment for 
onshore wind developments has also troubled proponents of the technology.50 
Obstacles to the full integration of storage and demand response technologies 
also remain in place. 
With regard to smart metering technologies, the UK has been at the forefront 
of the smart meter transition. However, its Smart Metering Implementation 
Programme has also not been without its challenges.51 There are a number of 
novel aspects about the UK’s approach to the roll-out, but the one that has caused 
perhaps the most issues for the UK has been the decision to place the roll-out in 
the hands of the utility suppliers.  
Thus, the policy framework for the low carbon transition is a mixed bag. 
While ostensibly in favor of the low-carbon transition, the implementation of 
 
 46 DEP’T FOR BUS., ENERGY & INDUS. STRATEGY, DIGEST OF UNITED KINGDOM ENERGY STATISTICS 
(DUKES) 2018: MAIN REPORT 1, 11 (2018) [hereinafter DIGEST OF UNITED KINGDOM ENERGY STATISTICS].  
 47 UK GOVERNMENT, 28 APRIL 2017: UK NATIONAL ENERGY EFFICIENCY ACTION PLAN AND ANNUAL 
REPORT, 1 (UK) [hereinafter UK NATIONAL ENERGY EFFICIENCY ACTION PLAN]. 
 48 How the UK is Progressing, COMM. ON CLIMATE CHANGE, https://www.theccc.org.uk/tackling-
climate-change/reducing-carbon-emissions/how-the-uk-is-progressing/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2020). 
 49 Josh Gabbatiss, A ‘Hostile Environment’ for Renewables: Why has UK Clean Energy Investment 
Plummeted?, INDEPENDENT (May 19, 2018, 7:14 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/environment/uk-
renewable-energy-investment-targets-wind-solar-power-onshore-a8358511.html. 
 50 Josh Gabbatiss, Environmental Impact of Policies that Led to Collapse of Onshore Wind Was Not 
Considered by Government, THE INDEPENDENT (May 6, 2018, 11:30 AM), https://www.independent.co.uk/ 
news/uk/politics/wind-power-onshore-policies-environmental-impact-government-collapse-a8334786.html. 
 51 See generally Smart Metering Implementation Programme, SMART ENERGY CODE CO., https:// 
smartenergycodecompany.co.uk/smip/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2020).  
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policy continues to be informed by the incumbent market players. The 
consequential lack of clarity has allowed a climate of confusion to set in, with 
apparent knock-on effects for investment. Accordingly, while the strategic goals 
are clear, the implementation leaves plenty to be desired. 
B. Energy Profile 
1. Energy Mix 
a. UK’s Targets 
Decarbonization plays a key part in the UK’s energy strategy by virtue of a 
series of European and international commitments. With regard to the UK’s 
renewable energy targets, 15% of the UK’s energy consumption will be derived 
from renewable energy sources by 2020.52 Sub-targets for electricity (30%), heat 
(12%), and transport (10%) have also been set.53 The UK’s progress is monitored 
and reported every two years, by reference to its targets and the detailed roadmap 
set out in its National Renewable Energy Action Plan.54 
The UK has also committed to making ambitious energy savings, with a 
target to reduce its final energy consumption by 18% relative to 2007 levels.55 
Finally, under the Climate Change Act 2008 the UK has committed to reduce its 
greenhouse gas emissions by 80% by 2050, compared to 1990 levels.56 
b. UK’s Energy Mix 
In 2017, up to 80% of the UK’s primary energy consumption was from fossil 
fuels, mainly oil and natural gas.57 However, the share of fossil fuels has 
declined in recent years, driven by a significant decline in coal production.58 
 
 52 DECC 2010, supra note 40, at 5. 
 53 Id. 
 54 See id. at 4.  
 55 DECC 2014, supra note 41, at 5. 
 56 See Simon Evans, In-Depth Q & A: The UK Becomes First Major Economy to Set Net-Zero Climate 
Goal, CARBON BRIEF: CLEAR ON CLIMATE (June 12, 2019, 4:18 PM), https://www.carbonbrief.org/in-depth-qa-
the-uk-becomes-first-major-economy-to-set-net-zero-climate-goal. 
 57 Jocelyn Timperley, Six Charts Show Mixed Progress for UK Renewables, CARBON BRIEF: CLEAR ON 
CLIMATE (July 30, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.carbonbrief.org/six-charts-show-mixed-progress-for-uk-
renewables. 
 58 See id.  
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Overall primary energy production in the UK increased by 1.2% in 2016 
compared to 2015,59 primarily due to the new fields starting production in the 
UK Continental Shelf (UKCS)—more projects have been recently announced.60 
As a result, there was a rise in the production of primary oil (42%) and natural 
gas (32%).61 Coal production was reduced due to both the 2015 closure of the 
last large deep mines and a decline in electricity generator demand.62 Indeed, 
coal accounted for only 2% of total production in 2016—a record low.63 The 
shift from coal to gas is the most striking development in the UK’s fuel mix over 
the past half-century. Primary electricity sources (nuclear, wind, and solar), 
bioenergy, and waste accounted for 16% and 9% of total production in 2016, 
respectively.64  
The Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) 
publishes quarterly statistical reports on energy trends. As of September 2018, 
BEIS reports that natural gas and petroleum remained the most important 
sources of indigenous energy production.65 However, the share of coal was 
negligible; indeed, in the most recent quarter,66 the outputs of (1) nuclear; (2) 
wind, solar and hydro; and (3) bioenergy and waste were considerably higher. 
Concerning electricity generation, approximately 42% of electricity was 
generated from gas in quarter 2 of 2018; coal’s share continued to decline, falling 
to 1.6%.67 Meanwhile, generation from low-carbon (nuclear and renewable) 
sources provided more than half of the generation (53.4%).68 The renewable 
generation share was 31.7%.69 
Efforts to improve the UK’s renewable energy position have been bolstered 
by, among other things, the ongoing work at the Drax power plant facility.70 
 
 59 DEP’T FOR BUS., ENERGY & INDUS. STRATEGY, UK ENERGY IN BRIEF 2017 1, 6. [hereinafter UK 
ENERGY IN BRIEF 2017]. 
 60 BP Development of Two New Fields Demonstrates Remaining Potential of UKCS, OGUK, https:// 
oilandgasuk.co.uk/bp-development-of-two-new-fields-demonstrates-remaining-potential-of-ukcs/ (last visited 
Oct. 18, 2019).  
 61 UK ENERGY IN BRIEF 2017, supra note 59, at 6.  
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 DEP’T FOR BUS., ENERGY & INDUS. STRATEGY, ENERGY TRENDS: SEPTEMBER 2018, 5 [hereinafter 
ENERGY TRENDS: SEPTEMBER 2018].  
 66 At the time of writing this Article.  
 67 ENERGY TRENDS: SEPTEMBER 2018, supra note 65, at 48. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. at 3. 
 70 See Jillian Ambrose, Drax Owner Plans to Be World’s First Carbon-Negative Business, GUARDIAN 
(Dec. 9, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/dec/10/drax-owner-plans-worlds-first-carbon-
negative-business.  
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Previously a coal-fired generation facility, efforts are underway to secure a coal-
free future for the plant.71 Following the conversion of four of its coal units, 
Drax now has four biomass generating units—the remaining two coal units will 
soon be replaced with gas-fired power generating units.72 However, efforts to 
reduce carbon output will almost certainly be hampered not just by the 
development of the UKCS, but also by the re-commencement of the UK’s 
hydraulic fracking program.73 
Nuclear power continues to play an important role in the UK’s low-carbon 
transition strategy. Around fifteen nuclear reactors generate approximately 21% 
of the UK’s energy.74 While half of this capacity is due to retire by 2025, the 
Government has worked hard to create a favorable policy for nuclear energy, 
with a number of several new projects now in the pipeline. The most prominent 
among these may be the EDF-led Hinkley Point C project. Hinkley Point C will 
provide 3.2GW of secure, base-load, low carbon electricity for at least sixty 
years.75 EDF is also developing the Sizewell C project.76  
In addition to its nuclear strategy, the UK is increasing its renewable 
electricity generation capabilities: in quarter 2 of 2018, renewables accounted 
for 31.7% of electricity generation—a record high.77 Since 2012, the UK has 
halved carbon emissions in the electricity generation sector; it now boasts the 
fourth cleanest power system in Europe.78  
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the UK’s reliance on gas hinders its ability 
to meet its emission targets and provides an incentive to maintain high levels of 
carbon output. This remains an area where considerable progress could and 
should be made, particularly in light of the UK’s change of fortune with respect 
to for its security of supply. Given the historically significant supplies of 
indigenous fossil fuel resources, the UK has historically occupied a position as 
a net exporter of energy. However, this changed in the course of the early 2000s, 
with the UK became a net importer of energy. In quarter 2 of 2018, it was 
 
 71 Id.  
 72 Drax Closer to Coal Free Future with Fourth Biomass Unit Conversion, DRAX (Aug. 20, 2018), 
https://www.drax.com/press_release/drax-closer-coal-free-future-fourth-biomass-unit-conversion/. 
 73 DEP’T FOR BUS., ENERGY & INDUS. STRATEGY, GUIDANCE ON FRACKING: DEVELOPING SHALE GAS IN 
THE UK. 
 74 Nuclear Power in the United Kingdom, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS. (Nov. 2018), http://www.world-
nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-t-z/united-kingdom.aspx.  
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 ENERGY TRENDS: SEPTEMBER 2018, supra note 65, at 48. 
 78 UK Enjoyed ‘Greenest Year for Electricity Ever’ in 2017, BBC (Dec. 28, 2017), http://www.bbc.co.uk/ 
news/uk-42495883. 
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reported by BEIS that the UK remains a net importer of energy, with 34.1% of 
its energy supplied by imports. In 2017, the UK’s net import dependency was 
35.8%—a decline from 2016.79  
In terms of the UK’s “greening” of the electricity mix, it would be remiss 
not to emphasize the important leadership role of Scotland in the low-carbon 
transition. Renewables were the single largest source of electricity generated in 
Scotland in 2015, commanding 42% of generation.80 For comparison purposes, 
nuclear comprised 35% and fossil fuels 22% of electricity generated.81 Scotland 
is also a net exporter of electricity, exporting almost 30% of the total generation 
in 2015.82 However, it is notable that Scotland is a devolved region of the UK. 
While energy policy remains centralized in the Westminster Government, 
Scotland has the power of planning rules, for example. A discussion on energy 
in the UK should note further that Scotland as a region has been agitating for 
independence in recent years: the last referendum, which resulted in a “remain” 
vote, was held in 2014.83 The Scottish Government is currently focusing its 
efforts on getting a “good deal” for Scotland out of Brexit, but if a “good deal” 
cannot be struck, another referendum may be held.84 Although a hypothetical 
scenario, it is important to note that the composition of the UK’s energy mix 
would likely look very different in Scotland’s absence. The rest of the UK’s 
progress has lagged significantly behind that of Scotland’s. Accordingly, 
Scotland helps to inflate the overall figures for the UK. If Scotland were to 
become independent, the rest of the UK would no longer be able to take 
Scotland’s energy statistics into account when reporting on and monitoring the 
UK’s progress. The UK Government must take this into consideration when 
formulating its energy strategy. In particular, the UK Government must ensure 
that each of the southern regions is harnessing to the fullest extent the low-
carbon resources available to them, in order to match if not exceed the progress 
being made north of the border. 
 
 79 ENERGY TRENDS: SEPTEMBER 2018, supra note 65, at 14.  
 80 High Level Summary of Statistics Trend Last update: Thursday, December 22, 2016 Electricity 
Generation, SCOTTISH GOVERNMENT, https://www2.gov.scot/Topics/Statistics/Browse/Business/ 
TrenRenEnergy (last visited Feb. 13, 2020). 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 See Philip Sim, Scottish Independence: Could a New Referendum Still Be Held?, BBC NEWS (Jan. 31, 
2020).  
 84 Scott MacNab, Nicola Sturgeon: I Won’t Call a Second Scottish Independence Vote This Year, 
SCOTSMAN (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.scotsman.com/news/politics/general-election/nicola-sturgeon-i-won-
t-call-a-second-scottish-independence-vote-this-year-1-4835640. 
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c. UK’s Progression Against Its Targets 
The reports on the UK’s progress against its targets have been mixed. At 
times, the UK has appeared to lag significantly behind its European neighbors.85 
At other times, it would seem to be on course to hit—and potentially surpass—
its targets.86 The UK’s NREAP, published in 2010, acknowledged that efforts to 
integrate renewable energy resources into the fuel mix will need to accelerate if 
the UK is to meet its 2020 targets.87 In 2017, the UK saw renewable energy’s 
share of electricity generation jump to 29.3%.88 With the UK now comfortably 
producing one-quarter of its electricity from renewables, the overall target of 
15% consumption from renewables seems increasingly achievable. Electricity 
generation from coal amounted to a mere 1.6% in quarter 2 of 2018, while 
natural gas remained dominant with a share of 42% (compared to 2% and 41.3% 
in quarter 2 of 2017, respectively).89 The share of renewables grew from 30.6% 
in quarter 2 of 2017 to 31.7% in quarter 2 of 2018. These figures are indicative 
of a shift away from fossil fuels for electricity generation purposes. 
Concerning the UK’s energy savings target, energy consumption is on a 
general downward trend.90 Indeed, primary energy consumption fell by 15% and 
final energy consumption by 11% in 2015 as compared to 2007.91 However, the 
UK still needs to achieve an 18% reduction in final energy consumption by 2020 
(a 20% reduction in primary energy consumption). 
By 2017, UK greenhouse gas emissions were 44% below 1990 levels.92 The 
UK managed to meet its first carbon budget (2008–2012) and is, according to 
the Committee on Climate Change, likely to outperform its second (2013–2017) 
and third (2018–2022) budgets. However, it may struggle to meet its fourth 
budget, covering 2023–2027.  
The role of Scotland in the UK’s achievement of its targets should be 
highlighted. Scotland exceeded its 2020 target to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions by 42% six years early.93 Meanwhile, 2017 was a record year for 
 
 85 Alan Martin, The UK Still Has Some Way to Go to Hit Its 2020 Renewable Energy Target, ALPHR 
(Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.alphr.com/energy/1008375/uk-renewable-energy-progress-2020.  
 86 UK Set to Smash Renewable Energy Targets for 2020, SOLAR DAILY (June 1, 2018), http://www. 
solardaily.com/reports/UK_set_to_smash_renewable_energy_targets_for_2020_999.html.  
 87 DECC 2010, supra note 40, at 5. 
 88 DIGEST OF UNITED KINGDOM ENERGY STATISTICS, supra note 46, at 11.  
 89 ENERGY TRENDS: SEPTEMBER 2018, supra note 65, at 48. 
 90 UK NATIONAL ENERGY EFFICIENCY ACTION PLAN, at 1. 
 91 Id.  
 92 How the UK is Progressing, supra note 48.  
 93 Scotland Exceeds Emissions Targets–Six Years Early, BBC (June 14, 2016), https://www.bbc.co.uk/ 
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Scotland, with 68.1% of electricity derived from renewable sources.94 But while 
Scotland’s runaway success helps to bolster the UK’s overall figures, it does 
mean that the UK is heavily dependent on Scotland for renewable energy 
resources. If Scotland were to become an independent nation in the future, then 
the UK’s low carbon status would take a serious hit.  
2. Market and Market Players 
a. Market 
The electricity and gas markets in the UK are fully privatized, both at 
wholesale and retail levels. The electricity market in the UK is divided into two 
networks. On the one hand, England, Scotland, and Wales form the Great Britain 
(GB) system. On the other hand, Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland 
(also referred to as “Ireland”) constitute the Integrated Single Electricity Market 
(I-SEM). 
The GB market is regulated by the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority 
(GEMA), which operates through the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets 
(Ofgem). Meanwhile, the I-SEM is regulated jointly by Northern Ireland’s 
Utility Regulator (UREGNI), and the Irish regulator, Commission of Regulation 
of Utilities (CRU). The decision-making body responsible for the governance of 
the SEM is the SEM Committee, which is comprised of the CRU, Utility 
Regulator, and an independent member.  
The GB market is operated by National Grid in its guise as the Electricity 
System Operator. Meanwhile, the SEM is operated by the SEM Operator or 
SEM-O. 
b. Market Players 
i. Great Britain 
The GB market is largely decentralized and privatized. Only the regulator, 
Ofgem, is a governmental body. The transmission system is divided into three 
regions, owned and operated by the same three entities: (1) National Grid 
Electricity Transmission (NGET) in England and Wales; (2) Scottish Power 
Transmission; and (3) Scottish Hydro Electric Transmission in Scotland (each a 
 
news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-36519506. 
 94 ‘Record’ Year for Renewable Electricity Generation, BBC (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.bbc.co.uk/ 
news/uk-scotland-scotland-business-43586438. 
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“Transmission System Operator” or TSO). The GB transmission system as a 
whole is operated by the System Operator, National Grid. Ownership of the 
transmission network has been certified by the Commission as fully unbundled, 
with the Scottish TSOs certified under Article 9(9) of Directive 2009/72/EC.95  
The GB market will be undergoing an important change during the period 
until 2030 when the GB distribution network operators (DNOs) transition into 
distribution system operators (DSOs).96 This far-reaching change will see the 
operator adopt a more active role in the management of electricity generation 
and consumption. It should also enable customers to play a more active role as 
both producers and consumers. Presently, ownership and operation of the 
distribution network is divided up between a number of DNOs.  
The retail electricity market is fully open to competition, with a range of 
domestic and non-domestic suppliers active in the market. In June 2018, there 
were seventy-three active domestic suppliers.97 However, the retail market is 
presently dominated by six large, vertically integrated suppliers known as the 
“Big 6.”98 An important aspect of the GB retail market is the ownership of the 
big utility suppliers by international companies. EDF Energy is wholly owned 
by the French state-owned EDF.99 Npower is presently a subsidiary of the 
German company, Innogy SE (itself a subsidiary of RWE).100 E.ON UK is part 
of the E.ON group, headquartered in Germany.101 Scottish Power is a subsidiary 
of the Spanish giant, Iberdrola.102 SSE and British Gas remain British-owned 
companies, although British Gas is a subsidiary of the UK-owned and based 
Centrica.103  
Notably, both E.ON and RWE underwent drastic corporate restructurings in 
2016, in response to Germany’s so-called “Energiewende.”104 RWE hived off 
 
 95 Single Market Progress Report: United Kingdom, EUR. COMM’N, COM (2014) 634 final, at 232 (Oct. 
13, 2014). 
 96 Open Networks Project: Overview, ENERGY NETWORKS ASSOCIATION, http://www.energynetworks. 
org/electricity/futures/open-networks-project/open-networks-project-overview/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2020). 
 97 See Number of Active Domestic Suppliers by Fuel Type (GB), OFGEM https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/data-
portal/number-active-domestic-suppliers-fuel-type-gb (last updated Jan. 2020).  
 98 OFGEM, RETAIL ENERGY MARKETS IN 2016, at 9 (2016) [hereinafter RETAIL ENERGY MARKETS]. 
 99 A Beginner’s Guide to the Big 6 Energy Companies, OVO ENERGY, https://www.ovoenergy.com/ 
guides/energy-guides/big-six-energy-companies.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2020).  
 100 Tom Käckenhoff & Philip Blenkinsop, E.ON to Tackle Npower After EU Clears Innogy Takeover, 
REUTERS (Sep. 17, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-innogy-m-a-e-on-eu/e-on-to-tackle-npower-after-
eu-clears-innogy-takeover-idUSKBN1W20S2. 
 101 Id.  
 102 A Beginner’s Guide to the Big 6 Energy Companies, supra note 99.  
 103 Id.  
 104 Guy Chazan, Eon and RWE Pursue Radical Restructurings, FIN. TIMES (May 18, 2016), https://www. 
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its renewable energy, network, and retail businesses into Innogy SE, with the-
then Npower becoming a subsidiary of the latter and renamed as Npower 
Limited.105 RWE Generation UK PLC acquired the coal, natural gas, and oil-
fired plants formerly operated by Npower.106 Meanwhile, E.ON created a new 
subsidiary, Uniper, to keep its fossil fuel assets.107 E.ON retained the 
renewables, distribution, and retail businesses.108 There are reports that Npower 
will be acquired from Innogy SE by E.ON UK, as part of a planned asset swap 
between RWE and E.ON.109 
Table 5 outlining the different market players in the GB market is provided 
below. 
Table 5: The Different Market Players in the Great Britain Market 
Regulatory Authority Ofgem 
Generators Fossil-fuel, Renewable, Nuclear, and Aggregators. 
Transmission Asset 
Owner 
England and Wales: National Grid Electricity 
Transmission PLC (NGET) 
 
Scotland: Scottish Power Transmission Limited (Scottish 
Power) and Scottish Hydro Electric Transmission PLC 
(Scottish Hydro)—note that Scottish Hydro now trades as 
Scottish & Southern Electricity Networks. 
Transmission System 
Operator 
The GB system as a whole is operated by a single System 
Operator, National Grid. 
Three regional Transmission Operators operate within 
their distinct transmission areas: 
 
(1) England and Wales: NGET 
 




 105 Tom Käckenhoff & Philip Blenkinsop, E.ON to Tackle Npower after EU Clears Innogy Takeover, 
REUTERS (Sept. 17, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-innogy-m-a-e-on-eu/e-on-to-tackle-npower-after-eu-
clears-innogy-takeover-idUSKBN1W20S2. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Adam Vaughan, Job Fears for Npower Staff, with Ownership Transferring to E.ON, GUARDIAN 
(Dec. 28, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/dec/28/job-fears-for-npower-staff-with-ownership-
transferring-to-eon. 
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Electricity North West Limited 
 
Northern Powergrid owns DNOs Northern Powergrid 
(Northeast) Limited and Northern Powergrid (Yorkshire) 
PLC 
 
Scottish and Southern Energy owns DNOs Scottish Hydro 
Electric Power Distribution PLC and Southern Electric 
Power Distribution PLC 
 
Scottish Power Energy Networks owns DNOs SP 
Distribution Ltd and SP Manweb PLC 
 
UK Power Networks owns London Power Networks 
PLC, South Eastern Power Networks PLC, and Eastern 
Power Networks PLC 
 
Western Power Distribution owns Western Power 
Distribution (East Midlands) PLC, Western Power 
Distribution (West Midlands) PLC, Western Power 
Distribution (South West) PLC, and Western Power 
Distribution (South Wales) PLC 
System Operator National Grid 
Suppliers 
The UK market is dominated by the “Big Six” largest 
suppliers: British Gas, EDF Energy, E.ON, Npower, 
Scottish Power, and SSE (holding as of Q3 2017 81% of 
electricity, and 80% gas supply). Note that the “Big Six” 
will be consolidated to the “Big Five” if the proposed 
asset swap between RWE and E.ON goes ahead. 
 
As of June 2018 (quarter 2), some seventy-three active 
domestic suppliers were in operation.  
Consumers Industry, Commercial, SMEs, Residential 
ii. Northern Ireland  
Northern Ireland is part of the I-SEM with Ireland, so different arrangements 
apply. 
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The Northern Ireland transmission system is owned by Northern Ireland 
Electricity Networks (NIE Networks), a private entity, and operated by SONI.110 
SONI is owned by the Irish TSO, EirGrid, which is an Irish state-owned 
entity.111 NIE Networks is also the owner and operator of the distribution 
system.112 Notably, NIE Networks is owned by the Irish state-owned utility 
company, the Electricity Supply Board (ESB), which acquired NIE Networks 
from Viridian in December 2010.113 Article 9(9) of Directive 2009/72/EC has 
been applied to Northern Ireland.114 
The Northern Irish retail market is open to the competition but has far fewer 
players. The incumbent, Power NI, dominates in the domestic sector.115 Note 
that Viridian Group PLC is a hugely dominant player in the Northern Ireland 
retail market: it owns both Power NI and Energia, the supply businesses which 
it retained following the acquisition of NIE Networks by ESB in 2010. 
Accordingly, Viridian has influenced both the domestic and commercial retail 
markets. 
A Table 6 outlining the different market players in the I-SEM may be found 
below. 
Table 6: The Integrated Single Electricity Market Between Northern 
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland 
 Republic of Ireland Northern Ireland 
Regulatory 
Authority 
CRU  UREGNI  
Generators 
Fossil fuels, Renewable, 
Demand-Side units, 
Aggregators 






Northern Ireland Electricity 
(NIE) Networks Limited 
Transmission System 
Operator 
EirGrid  SONI  
 
 110 Our Company History, N. IR. ELECTRICITY NETWORKS (2019), https://www.nienetworks.co.uk/about-
us/company-history. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Council Directive 2009/72 art. 9 O.J. (L 211) 1. 
 115 UTILITY REGULATOR, RETAIL MARKET MONITORING 3 (2018) [hereinafter RETAIL MARKET 
MONITORING]. 
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Distribution Asset 
Owner 
ESB NIE Networks Limited 
Distribution System 
Operator 
ESB Networks Limited NIE Networks Limited 
Market Operator SEMO  SEMO  
Suppliers 
BEenergy, Bord Gais 
Energy, Electric Ireland, 
Energia, Go Power, Just 
Energy, Naturgy, Panda 
Power, Pinergy, Prepay 
Power, SSE Airtricity, 
Vayu116 
 
Electric Ireland, SSE 
Airtricity, Click Energy, 
Budget Energy, Energia, 
Go Power/LLC Power, 








c. Customer Profile and Consumption Trends 
i. Great Britain 
In terms of overall energy consumption in the GB market, transport 
continues to hoard the lion’s share of consumption. In 2017, transport accounted 
for 40% of final energy consumption.118 The domestic sector followed, 
representing 28%.119 The industry and the services sectors made up the rest with 
shares of 17% and 15%, respectively.120 
The GB electricity market can be divided into two segments: domestic and 
non-domestic. The non-domestic segment includes small businesses, up to large 
industrial and commercial users.121 As of March 2016, non-domestic users 
accounted for 64% of total electricity consumption, and 39% of gas.122 
Concerning electricity consumption, there is a general pattern of declining 
consumption: total consumption decreased by 1% in quarter 2 of 2018 compared 
to quarter 2 of 2017.123 
 
 116 List of Energy Suppliers, CRU, https://www.cru.ie/home/customer-care/energy/communication/ (last 
visited Feb. 19, 2020).  
 117 RETAIL MARKET MONITORING, supra note 115, at 5.  
 118 DEP’T FOR BUS., ENERGY & INDUS. STRATEGY, UK ENERGY IN BRIEF 2018, at 8. 
 119 DEP’T FOR BUS., ENERGY & INDUS. STRATEGY, ENERGY CONSUMPTION IN THE UK (2018). 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id, at 5 
 123 ENERGY TRENDS: SEPTEMBER 2018, supra note 65, at 3.  
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ii. Northern Ireland 
The Northern Ireland electricity market can be similarly divided into 
domestic and non-domestic customers. In 2016, of the total customers in the 
electricity market in Northern Ireland, 91.7% were in the domestic sector; 8.3% 
were business customers.124 But while the domestic sector accounted for 36.5% 
of consumption, the non-domestic sector accounted for the lion’s share of 
consumption, at 63.5%.125 
In the period 2015–2016, domestic electricity consumption in Northern 
Ireland was around 2,925 GWh.126 Non-domestic consumption was around 
4,705 GWh.127 A slight downward trend in annual electricity consumption in 
Northern Ireland over the period 2010–2017 has been observed. The total 
consumption in 2017 was 7.7% lower than 2010 levels.128 
3. Transmission System 
a. Great Britain 
The GB system transmits high-voltage electricity through a transmission 
grid and has overhead lines ranging from 400kV to 275kV and below.129 
Three entities provide the high-voltage network within their onshore 
transmission areas: (1) National Grid Electricity Transmission PLC (NGET) for 
England and Wales;130 (2) Scottish Power Transmission Limited for Southern 
Scotland; and (3) Scottish Hydro Electric Transmission PLC for Northern 
Scotland and the Scottish island groups.131 The GB system as a whole is operated 
by a single System Operator, National Grid. 
The UK’s transmission network is bolstered by four interconnectors: (1) 
England-France with “IFA” (2GW); (2) England-Netherlands with “BritNed” 
 
 124 UTILITY REGULATOR, RETAIL MARKET MONITORING: 2016, at 6 (2017). 
 125 Id. 
 126 DEP’T FOR ECON.: NORTHERN IRELAND STAT. & RES. AGENCY, ENERGY IN NORTHERN IRELAND 2018, 
at 36 (2018). 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. at 29. 
 129 Map of the UK’s Electricity Supply System Network Grid, BRITISH BUS. ENERGY (Apr. 2, 2016), 
https://britishbusinessenergy.co.uk/electricity-supply-system/. 
 130 Kirstie Massie & Katy Norman, United Kingdom, WHITE & CASE LLP, 3, https://www.whitecase.com/ 
sites/whitecase/files/files/download/publications/getting-deal-through-electricity-regulation-2018-united-
kingdom.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2020). 
 131 See The GB Electricity Transmission Network, OFGEM, https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/electricity/ 
transmission-networks/gb-electricity-transmission-network (last visited Feb. 19, 2020).  
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(1GW); (3) Northern Ireland-Scotland with “Moyle” (500 MW); and (4) Wales-
Ireland with “East West” (500 MW).132 The UK has one of the lowest electricity 
interconnection rates among EU Members, with an interconnection rate of 6% 
in 2014.133 Several measures will have to be put in place if the UK is going to 
reach its target—set by the European Commission—of 10% interconnection by 
2020.134 
b. Northern Ireland 
Northern Ireland’s transmission network consists of a series of 275kV and 
110 kV lines.135 In Northern Ireland, the TSO is the System Operator for 
Northern Ireland Limited (SONI).136 SONI is a subsidiary of EirGrid, which is 
the TSO in the Republic of Ireland.137 
The electricity market operates as a single wholesale market across the 
whole of the island of Ireland; accordingly, the Northern Irish grid is physically 
connected to the Irish grid via two interconnectors. A single 275 kV double 
circuit interconnector cable connects Northern Ireland with Ireland between 
Tandragee (Northern Ireland) and Louth (Ireland) substations.138 Meanwhile, 
two lower-capacity 110 kV cables connect at Letterkenny in Co. Donegal and 
Corraclassy in Co. Cavan.139 These interconnections facilitate the functioning of 
the I-SEM. Two interconnectors connect the I-SEM with the GB market.140 The 
Moyle Interconnector links Northern Ireland to Scotland.141 The I-SEM is also 
connected to GB via the East-West Interconnector, which connects Dublin, 
Ireland to Wales.142 
 
 132 See Electricity Interconnectors, OFGEM, https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/electricity/transmission-networks/ 
electricity-interconnectors (last visited Feb. 19, 2020). 
 133 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Achieving the 10% 
Electricity Interconnection Target, at 5, COM (2015) 82 final (Feb. 25, 2015). 
 134 Id. 
 135 EIRGRID GROUP, INNOVATIVE PARTNERSHIPS FOR A BRIGHTER TOMORROW 15 (2017). 
 136 See generally id.  
 137 Id. at 1.  
 138 Id. at 15.  
 139 See Transmission System 400, 275, 220 and 100kV September 2016, EIRGRID GROUP (2016), 
http://www.eirgridgroup.com/site-files/library/EirGrid/EirGrid-Group-Transmission-System-Geographic-Map-
Sept-2016.pdf. 
 140 See EIRGRID GROUP, supra note 6–9.  
 141 See Interconnection, SONI, http://www.soni.ltd.uk/customer-and-industry/interconnection/ (last 
visited Feb. 19, 2020). 
 142 Id. 
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In Northern Ireland, small scale generators (less than 5 MW) connect 
exclusively to the distribution network.143 Larger generators may connect to 
either distribution or transmission, but the largest generators of 110kV or above 
must apply to the TSO for connection to the transmission network.144 The 
application procedure varies depending upon multiple factors, including size. 
Figure 7 maps out the UK’s transmission system, by the operator. 
Figure 7: Transmission Network in UK145 
4. Distribution System 
The distribution network for the UK is managed by a far wider variety of 
operators than the transmission network. For the distribution network, the GB 
system is divided into eight regions. Northern Ireland is a separate region. Figure 
8 offers a visualization of the current arrangements. Note that the Republic of 
Ireland is included in Figure 8 below but should be ignored for this Section. 
 
 
 143 NIE NETWORKS, DISTRIBUTION GENERATION APPLICATION AND OFFER PROCESS STATEMENT 1 (2018). 
 144 Id. 
 145 Find Your Gas & Electricity Distributors, SELECTRA (Aug. 26, 2019), https://selectra.co.uk/energy/ 
guides/distribution. 
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Figure 8: Distribution Network in UK146 
C. Governance System 
1. Energy Strategy 
a. Great Britain 
Britain’s energy strategy is informed by the Climate Change Act 2008, under 
which the UK committed to reducing GHG emissions by 80% by 2050, 
compared to 1990 levels.147 A pathway for the achievement of this target was 
established by the Clean Growth Strategy (CGS), published in October 2017.148 
The key policies and proposals evident in the CGS are as follows: 
 Accelerating Clean Growth; 
 Improving Business and Industry Efficiency; 
 Improving the Energy Efficiency of Homes; 
 
 146 Id. 
 147 DEP’T FOR BUS., ENERGY & INDUS. STRATEGY, THE CLEAN GROWTH STRATEGY: LEADING THE WAY 
TO A LOW CARBON FUTURE 5 (2017) [hereinafter THE CLEAN GROWTH STRATEGY]. 
 148 See generally id.  
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 Accelerating the Shift to Low Carbon Transport; 
 Delivering Clean, Smart, Flexible Power; 
 Enhancing the Benefits and Value of Natural Resources; 
 Leading in the Public Sector; and 
 Government Leadership.149 
Public and private investment plays a prominent role in the CGS. The 
Government has allocated £2.5 billion of investment to low carbon innovation 
for the period 2015–2021, with the bulk of funding targeted at the transport 
sector (33%).150 The concept of cross-collaboration with business, civil society, 
and the public pervades the CGS. Thus, it is made clear that the focus of the 
CGS is on creating a supportive, enabling environment for investment.  
On the regulatory side of the energy strategy, Ofgem has published its 
blueprint, setting out a pathway for regulation in the coming years.151 It focuses 
on regulatory arrangements in the following areas:  
 Rolling-out smart-meters and supporting the energy transition; 
 Balancing supply and demand; 
 Ensuring network capacity; 
 Strengthening system coordination and the institutional framework; 
and 
 Supporting innovation.152 
b. Northern Ireland 
Energy policy is fully devolved to Northern Ireland. The NI Executive 
published its Strategic Energy Framework (SEF) for the period 2010–2020 in 
September 2010.153 The SEF provides a clear signal of the Executive’s priorities 
for the energy sector. Its central aim is to create a more secure and sustainable 
energy system for Northern Ireland, built around competitive markets; a secure, 
efficient, and sustainable energy supply; and robust infrastructure.154 
The NI Executive published its Report on the Draft Programme for 
Government (PfG), containing fourteen strategic outcomes to set a clear agenda 
 
 149 See id. at 12–16.  
 150 See id. at 17.  
 151 OFGEM, OUR STRATEGY FOR REGULATING THE FUTURE ENERGY SYSTEM, (2017). 
 152 See generally id. 
 153 See DEP’T OF ENTERPRISE, TRADE AND INV., ENERGY: A STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR NORTHERN 
IRELAND (2010). 
 154 See id. 
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for the NI Executive, in December 2016.155 The draft PfG Framework includes 
a number of references to energy, with a specific ambition for a secure, 
sustainable, and cost-efficient energy supply.156 But with the collapse of the NI 
Executive in January 2017, Northern Ireland has been thrown into flux. Clearly, 
a new PfG will be necessary once power-sharing is reinstated. But given the 
continued political impasse, it is unclear what progress will be made over the 
coming months. Naturally, this will have serious implications for Northern 
Ireland’s energy strategy, and progress thereon. 
A new PfG will inevitably be influenced by the outcomes of the UK’s Brexit 
negotiations. Presently, the UK is working hard to ensure that the I-SEM 
continues to function unimpeded post Brexit, but this would likely result in 
Northern Ireland agreeing to certain rules relating to wholesale markets while 
Great Britain withdraws from them.157 This will pose further problems from a 
power-sharing perspective, as the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) continues 
to resist suggestions that Northern Ireland may need, in some respects, to have 
different arrangements from Great Britain.158 
2. Integration of Governance and Energy Strategy 
In the UK, and particularly so within GB, a pro-market mentality dominates 
energy discourse. While energy governance and strategy are still politicized to 
the extent that it remains dictated by the government and the governmental 
regulator, energy policy exists within a “pro-market” framework. The UK’s 
tendency towards energy marketization was apparent in the merger of the 
Department of Energy and Climate Change with the Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills to form the Department for Business, Energy and 
Industrial Strategy. Northern Ireland, meanwhile, has a separate Department for 
Energy, with the I-SEM regulated by a state departmental body, and operated 
and managed by state-owned companies. In GB, notably, the market is regulated 
by a governmental agency, but is otherwise privatized.  
Energy security and climate change mitigation measures play pivotal roles 
in the UK-wide energy governance sphere, as they do in the UK-wide strategic 
framework for a low-carbon future. But there do appear to be inconsistencies. 
 
 155 NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY: COMM. FOR THE EXEC. OFFICE, REPORT ON THE EXECUTIVE’S DRAFT 
PROGRAM FOR GOVERNMENT 2016-21, at 6 (2016).  
 156 Id. at 19.  
 157 See I-SEM Will Continue in No-Deal Brexit, ARGUS MEDIA (Mar. 14, 2019), https://www.argusmedia. 
com/en/news/1866067-isem-will-continue-in-nodeal-brexit.  
 158 See Brexit: EU and UK Reach Deal but DUP Refuses Support, BBC NEWS (Oct. 17, 2019), https:// 
www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-50079385. 
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The CGS promotes investment and innovation as key to the achievement of its 
low carbon targets, but it is unclear the extent to which this message of an 
enabling investment environment has reached, and persuaded, private investors. 
Green energy investment in wind, solar, and other renewable energy sources 
actually halved in the course of recent years, with a 56% decline reported in 
2017.159 Mixed messages regarding the funding available for green energy 
projects will tend to dissuade investment, and recent cuts to subsidies,160 along 
with the commencement of the UK’s fracking program,161 will not assist the UK 
in establishing the sort of coherent, predictable investment climate that tends to 
attract private investment. Moreover, at the same time as the cuts to solar PV 
subsidies, fossil fuel generators were receiving around £3 billion through 
Capacity Market Auctions in 2017.162 The GB Capacity Market has now been 
suspended, following a ruling of the European Court and pending a full 
investigation by the Commission.163 It is important, however, not to misidentify 
correlation as causation. The downturn in private investment could feasibly 
stem, at least in part, from the increased business circumspection stemming from 
the Brexit negotiations.  
The aforementioned cuts to subsidies for solar panels, and a “hostile 
planning approach” to new wind turbine applications have also been blamed for 
a decline in domestic generation.164 Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, 
some industry analysts now believe that onshore wind and solar could be viable 
without subsidies by 2020, due to falling costs and advances in battery 
technology.165 While there may be a number of “lost years” until the point where 
these technologies are again considered viable without subsidies, it is possible 
 
 159 Adam Vaughan, UK Green Energy Investment Halves After Policy Changes, GUARDIAN (Jan. 16, 
2018), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/jan/16/uk-green-energy-investment-plunges-after-policy-
changes. 
 160 James Tapper, Green Energy Feels the Heat as Subsidies go to Fossil Fuels, GUARDIAN (June 23, 
2018), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/jun/23/green-energy-subsidies-community-projects-
fossil-fuels. 
 161 Adam Vaughan, Fast-Track Fracking Plan by the Government Prompts Criticism, GUARDIAN (May 
17, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/may/17/fast-track-fracking-plan-by-uk-government-
prompts-criticism. 
 162 Phil MacDonald, Subsidies to UK Coal Continue Despite Phase-Out Pledge, SANDBAG: SMARTER 
CLIMATE POLICY (Sept. 28, 2017), https://sandbag.org.uk/2017/09/28/7807/. 
 163 Case T-793/14, Tempus Energy Ltd. and Tempus Energy Tech. Ltd. v. European Comm’n supported 
by UK, 2013 E.C.R. 790. 
 164 Tapper, supra note 160.  
 165 Adam Vaughan, Subsidy-Free Renewable Energy Projects Set to Soar in UK, Analysts Say, GUARDIAN 
(Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/mar/20/uk-subsidy-free-renewable-energy-projects-set-
soar-aurora-energy-research-analysts. 
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that subsequent years will see these technologies re-establish themselves on the 
market. 
In summary, while the UK’s central energy strategy calls for a transition to 
a low-carbon energy market, the government’s tendency to appeal to the 
incumbent market interests means that the implementation of its strategy can 
appear to be biased towards those interests, at the possible expense of the low-
carbon transition. This being said, the UK can boast significant progress in 
growing its economy while reducing its emissions. Since 1990, its emissions 
have been cut by over 40%,166 while the economy has grown by two-thirds.167 
In quarter 2 of 2018, almost 54% of the UK’s electricity came from low-carbon 
sources.168 Based on these figures alone, the focus of UK energy strategy and 
governance, on encouraging investment and innovation in an enabling market 
environment, appears to be capable of delivering results. However, if these 
results are to be fully realized, it will be important for the UK’s low-carbon 
policy strategy to be implemented in a coherent and consistent manner. 
If the UK wishes to continue to lead in green growth, it must continue to 
attract investment during and after Brexit. As previously noted, it may be that 
the investment downturn which has been observed in the past couple years has 
been a response to the uncertainty surrounding the Brexit negotiations. But if 
this is so, then the UK may need to rethink its strategy. The clearer and more 
coherent its strategy is in times of uncertainty, the more confident businesses 
will be in investing.  
The future energy strategy of the UK will need to be informed to a large 
extent by the outcomes of the Brexit process; the energy governance structure 
will also need to respond to whatever new paradigm emerges. Notably, the CGS 
does not make mention of Brexit.169 This is unavoidable, as the Brexit vote was 
not until 2016. But this does mean that the CGS will need updating in the very 
near future. One area that requires clarification is exactly how close the ties 
between the UK and the EU will be after Brexit, whether it will still be part of 
the EU Internal Energy Market (IEM), or whether it will withdraw. The Political 
Declaration accompanying the UK-EU Withdrawal Agreement fell short of 
seeking continuing participation in the IEM, but did include at Clauses 66 and 
 
 166 2016 UK Provisional Greenhouse Gas Emissions, NAT’L STAT. (Mar. 30, 2017), https://assets. 
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/604327/2016_Provisional
_emissions_statistics_one_page_summary.pdf. 
 167 THE CLEAN GROWTH STRATEGY, supra note 147, at 5.  
 168 ENERGY TRENDS: SEPTEMBER 2018, supra note 65, at 3.  
 169 See generally THE CLEAN GROWTH STRATEGY, supra note 147. 
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67 a high-level commitment to cooperate on the supply of energy so as to ensure 
security of supply and trade over interconnectors.170 That being said, it is likely 
that continued access to the IEM will play a part in the UK’s strategy, not least 
because of the benefits of coordinated energy trading. However, if full 
membership was politically unsatisfactory, then this would complicate matters 
for Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland, of course, participates in the I-SEM with 
Ireland. To the extent this must continue after Brexit, then certain EU laws 
would have to continue to apply to Northern Ireland to allow for the continuation 
of the I-SEM. It appears to be the UK’s wish that the I-SEM continue after 
Brexit;171 for that to happen unimpeded, Northern Ireland will have to remain 
part of the IEM. However, if the UK made the decision to withdraw from the 
IEM, then observers may then witness a decoupling of the NI and GB markets. 
It remains to be seen how politically satisfactory such a situation would be. 
The UK’s departure from the EU could also have serious implications for 
future climate policy. Notably, Clause 78 of the Political Declaration states: 
“The future relationship should reaffirm the Parties’ commitments to 
international agreements to tackle climate change, including those which 
implement the United Nations Framework Conventions on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), such as the Paris Agreement.”172 The fact that the UK has bid to 
hold the 2020 Conference of the Parties (COP) UNFCCC suggests that it will 
strive to maintain its position as a world leader on climate change and honor its 
Paris commitments. Nevertheless, it is possible that the UK could backslide on 
the EU’s renewables and energy efficiency targets after Brexit. If it were to 
retreat from the EU’s targets, then the implications would likely be realized only 
in respect of the targets for 2030 and 2050, as the vast majority of the projects 
needed to hit the 2020 renewables targets will already have been approved. 
However, it is important to note that the UK has imposed on itself even more 
stringent requirements for carbon emissions pursuant to its Climate Change Act 
2008 (with a target to reduce GHG emissions by at least 80% of 1990 levels by 
2050). The UK has met its first two budgets and is on track to meet the third; 
however, the CCC cautions that more action is required to meet subsequent 
budgets.173 Nevertheless, the UK has been one of the EU’s worst offenders with 
 
 170 Political Declaration Setting Out the Framework for the Future Relationship Between the European 
Union and the United Kingdom, ¶¶ 66–67.  
 171 DEP’T FOR BUS., ENERGY & INDUS. STRATEGY, LEAVING THE EU: NEGOTIATION PRIORITIES FOR 
ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY, 2016-17, HC 909, at 19 (UK) [hereinafter LEAVING THE EU].  
 172 Political Declaration Setting Out the Framework for the Future Relationship Between the European 
Union and the United Kingdom, ¶ 78. 
 173 Ten Years of the Climate Change Act, COMM. ON CLIMATE CHANGE, https://www.theccc.org.uk/our-
impact/ten-years-of-the-climate-change-act/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2020). 
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regard to flouting environmental laws;174 while a post-Brexit “green watchdog” 
has become moot, under current plans it will not have any powers related to 
climate change.175 Who will hold the UK government to account on climate 
change matters following its EU departure is, therefore, unknown.  
Accordingly, it is conceivable that a considerable amount of re-thinking will 
be required with respect to the UK’s energy strategy in the coming months and 
years. But it will only be possible to know exactly how much re-thinking or re-
design will actually be necessary once the dust has settled on the Brexit 
arrangements. It may be that GB chooses to withdraw from the IEM. If GB were 
to withdraw but Northern Ireland were to remain, then Northern Ireland and GB 
would likely become decoupled. In the event, however, that both Northern 
Ireland and GB stay within the IEM—as seems probable, given the efficiency 
costs of a GB exit—their energy policies would remain influenced by European 
IEM developments. 
With regard to Northern Ireland, while energy policy is now fully devolved 
to the NI Executive, the complex interconnected nature of energy policy, 
markets, systems, and infrastructure means that the UK government has always 
played an important role, directly and indirectly, in shaping Northern Ireland 
policy. Helpfully, the UK government recognizes the influence it has over 
Northern Ireland’s energy strategy. A report by the House of Commons Northern 
Ireland Affairs Committee, published in April 2017, provided a number of 
examples regarding the UK’s influence.176 One example cited was the UK’s 
Renewable Obligation (RO) scheme, introduced in 2002.177 The RO scheme was 
withdrawn in 2011.178 It was replaced with the Contracts for Difference (CfD) 
scheme, in which the subsidy varies according to the wholesale price.179 
Northern Ireland was compelled to withdraw its own Renewables Obligation 
scheme in response, to avoid the cost of subsidies increasing considerably.180 
Another example is the Carbon Price Floor, introduced in 2013. The Carbon 
Price Floor scheme introduced the obligation for industries to provide a top-up, 
 
 174 Jennifer Rankin, Activists Demand UK Environment Watchdog in Brexit Trade Deal, GUARDIAN 
(Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/nov/26/post-brexit-trade-deal-must-guarantee-uk-
environment-watchdog-green-groups. 
 175 James Tapper, UK’s Green Watchdog Will Be Powerless Over Climate Change Post-Brexit, OBSERVER 
(Sept. 2, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/sep/02/green-watchdog-powerless-climate-change-
post-brexit. 
 176 NORTHERN IRELAND AFFAIRS COMM., ELECTRICITY SECTOR IN IRELAND, 2016-17, HC 51, at 6 (2017).  
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payable if the market price for carbon fell below a certain level.181 The intention 
of the scheme was to stimulate investment in low-carbon infrastructure but, 
when in March 2014 the UK government announced a cap at £18 per tonne for 
the period from 2016/17 to 2019/20, Northern Ireland was compelled to seek an 
exemption to avoid SEM distortions.182 Despite achieving this exemption, the 
Carbon Price Floor, nevertheless, had an indirect effect on Northern Ireland’s 
electricity market, through reduced imports at the Moyle Interconnector.183 
Given the UK’s heady influence over Northern Ireland energy strategy, it 
will be important for the NI Executive and HM Government in Westminster to 
continue to liaise closely in the coming months as Brexit negotiations continue. 
The regulators will also need to play an important role, so collaboration between 
Ofgem and UREGNI should be championed. Much will depend on the outcome 
of the current negotiations, but it is feasible that Northern Ireland will seek to 
gain more independence from the UK on energy policy and related matters in 
the coming years—particularly if the UK’s exit from the EU puts an intolerable 
strain on the functioning of the I-SEM.  
D. Regulatory Framework and Energy Security 
1. Regulatory Framework 
a. Legislation Pertaining to the Electricity Market 
The legal framework governing the electricity markets in England, Scotland, 
and Wales arises from a string of regulations including, but not limited to, the 
Electricity Act 1989 (as amended and supplemented); the Utilities Act 2000; the 
Energy Acts 2004, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2013, and 2016; the Climate Change Act 
2008; the Competition Act 1998; the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 
2013; and the Infrastructure Act 2015.184 
Notably, the Energy Act 2013, which amended the Electricity Act 1989, 
introduced the Electricity Market Reform (EMR).185 The EMR instigated two 
key changes, the CfD scheme and the capacity market. Both will be discussed 
below. In addition, the EMR also launched the emissions performance standard 
 
 181 See id. at 8–9.  
 182 See id.  
 183 See id. at 8.  
 184 Electricity Regulation: United Kingdom, GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH (Oct. 2019), https:// 
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(EPS) and the Carbon Price Floor. The key provisions of the Energy Act 2016, 
which amended the Electricity Act 1989, provide inter alia for the closure of the 
RO scheme for onshore wind generators.186 The CfD scheme replaces the RO 
scheme.187 
The key legislation in respect of the regulatory architecture of Northern 
Ireland’s electricity sector includes the Electricity (Northern Ireland) Order 
1992; the Energy (Northern Ireland) Order 2003; and the Electricity (Single 
Wholesale Market) (Northern Ireland) Order 2007.188  
b. Regulatory Framework and the Smart Grid 
i. Integration of Renewable Energy Sources 
The Electricity Act 1989 (as amended and supplemented) sets out a licensing 
regime which is regulated by the GEMA. A license is mandatory for the 
following activities: generation; participation in transmission; distribution; 
supply; participation in the operation of an electricity interconnector; and the 
provision of smart metering services.189 License applicants need to submit a 
written application and pay the relevant fee to the regulator, Ofgem. Certain 
actors, such as small-scale generators, distributors, and suppliers, may be 
exempted from holding a license insofar as they meet particular requirements.190 
Licenses are subject to different types of conditions including standard 
conditions (generally applicable to all licensees), amended standard conditions, 
and special conditions (specific to the licensee at issue). In addition to these 
requirements, licensees must observe relevant industry codes and standards, 
which are usually outlined in the standard conditions of their individual 
license.191 
The main planning acts which relate to England are the Town and Country 
Planning Act 1990; the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004; the 
Planning Act 2008 and the Localism Act 2011.192 The Wales framework is 
broadly similar to that of England, with the 1990 Act, 2004 Act, 2008 Act, and 
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2011 Act supplemented by the Planning (Wales) Act 2015.193 Pursuant to the 
Electricity Act 1989, the construction or extension of an onshore generation 
facility (with the exception of wind generation facilities) located in England and 
Wales with a capacity exceeding 50 MW currently requires the consent from the 
Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy under Section 36 
of the 1989 Act (this will change come 2019—as discussed below).194 Onshore 
generation facilities are usually classified as Nationally Significant 
Infrastructure Projects (NSIP) under the Planning Act 2008.195 The Secretary of 
State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy should sanction NSIPs 
through a Development Consent Order. However, the Energy Act 2016, coupled 
with the Infrastructure Planning (Onshore Wind Generating Stations) Order 
2016, withdrew onshore wind farms featuring a capacity surpassing 50 MW 
from the NSIP regime.196 The construction of non-wind onshore generation 
facilities in England with a capacity under 50 MW, may require approval from 
the relevant local planning authority in accordance with the Town and Country 
Planning Act 1990.197  
In Wales, most parts of the planning system are devolved. Onshore 
generation facilities with a capacity ranging from 10 to 50 MW are treated as 
Developments of National Significance and are decided by Welsh Ministers.198 
In April 2019, the Wales Act 2017 further consented powers over energy 
generating stations with a capacity of up to and including 350 MW onshore and 
in Welsh waters will be devolved to Wales.199  
In Scotland, development consent functions are fully devolved.200 In 
Scotland, applications are considered by the Scottish Ministers for electricity 
generating facilities in excess of 50 MW, or for overhead power lines and 
associated infrastructure, as well as large gas and oil pipelines.201 Applications 
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cover new projects and modifications to existing infrastructure. Below these 
limits, applications are made to local authorities. Notably, applications for 
marine energy are made to Marine Scotland.202 
In Northern Ireland, as in Scotland, development consent functions are fully 
devolved. In April 2015, a two-tier planning system came into force under the 
Planning Act (Northern Ireland) 2011. Each council is now the Local Planning 
Authority for its district council area. The Department of Environment (now the 
Department for Infrastructure) retains authority for regionally significant 
applications. 
With regard to wind generation in particular, local authorities have the 
ability to determine planning applications for onshore wind generation facilities 
of all capacities. In England, Wales, and Scotland small-scale domestic turbines 
may be considered “permitted developments” and thus not need planning 
permission; however, this is subject to strict conditions. In both Scotland203 and 
Wales,204 building-mounted developments require planning permission. In 
England, the rules have been relaxed, building-mounted developments may be 
permitted provided they comply with specific criteria.205 In Northern Ireland, 
wind turbines and wind farms always require planning permission.206 
Thus, the UK has a clear regulatory framework for planning applications for 
renewable energy developments. Yet, planning applications for new onshore 
wind developments have plummeted by 94% since the introduction of new 
policies in 2015.207 These policies sought to bring the planning application closer 
to local communities by allowing local authorities the final say on locations for 
onshore wind development. This occurred alongside a transfer of powers from 
the BEIS to the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government. 
Unfortunately, no cost-benefit analysis was undertaken, and the result has been 
a striking decline in applications. Around the same time, the government 
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withdrew its support schemes for solar; private investment has since declined 
significantly on solar technologies. 
With regard to connection arrangements, in both England and Wales, 
generation facilities with a capacity equal or superior to 100 MW may be 
connected to the transmission network; smaller facilities are directly connected 
to the distribution network.208 In Scotland, smaller generation facilities may also 
be directly connected to the transmission grid.209 Meanwhile, in Northern 
Ireland, small scale generation facilities (less than 5 MW) connect exclusively 
to the distribution network.210 Larger generators may connect to either 
distribution or transmission, but the largest generators of 110kV or above must 
apply to the TSO to connect to the transmission network.211 The application 
procedure is dependent upon various factors, including size. 
ii. Incentive Schemes (Feed-In Tariffs and Others) 
In 2002, the RO scheme became effective in England, Wales, and Scotland, 
whereas the RO scheme entered into effect in 2005 in Northern Ireland.212 It 
required all UK electricity suppliers to generate an increasing proportion of 
electricity from renewable energy sources.213 The RO scheme closed to all new 
generating capacity on March 31, 2017.214 However, the closure did not affect 
capacity with an accreditation date on or before the closure date.215  
The Energy Act 2013 instigated the Electricity Market Reform (EMR).216 
The EMR introduced the CfD scheme to promote low-carbon electricity 
generation and encourage investment in electricity from renewables.217 The CfD 
scheme replaced the old RO scheme.218 No decision has yet been taken by the 
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 214 RO Closure, OFGEM, https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/environmental-programmes/ro/about-ro/ro-closure 
(last visited Feb. 20, 2020). 
 215 Id. 
 216 Massie & Norman, supra note 130; see also Electricity Market Reform: Contracts for Difference, 
DEP’T FOR BUS., ENERGY & INDUS. STRATEGY, https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/electricity-market-
reform-contracts-for-difference (last updated Feb. 8, 2017). 
 217 See generally Electricity Market Reform: Contracts for Difference, supra note 216.  
 218 Catapult Energy Systems, GB Energy Industry, ch. 6 (2019).  
LEAL-ARCASETALPROOFS_3.25.20 5/3/2020 12:22 PM 
504 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34 
Northern Ireland Executive regarding Northern Ireland’s participation in a UK-
wide CfD scheme.219  
While CfDs are a useful mechanism to incentivize investment in 
renewables,220 BEIS has been criticized for effectively “locking out” mature 
renewable technologies such as solar and onshore wind221 from the scheme.222 
The third CfD allocation round opens in May 2019, but only less-established 
renewable technologies such as offshore wind, geothermal, and wave and tidal 
stream will be eligible.223 The Committee on Climate Change and the National 
Infrastructure Commission have been among the organizations calling for a 
rethink, and the BEIS has now indicated that “further refinements” may 
follow.224  
The EMR also introduced the GB capacity market (“CM”).225 The CM is 
covered in further detail in Section 6. Northern Ireland’s capacity market is 
different from that of GB’s, Northern Ireland’s capacity market is operated by 
the SEM-O as part of the I-SEM with the Republic of Ireland.226 
In addition to CfDs, the UK has mobilized supplementary policies such as 
the Feed-In Tariff (FIT) scheme, established in 2010, to generate electricity 
based on alternative energy sources.227 Payments under the FIT scheme are made 
by energy suppliers on a quarterly basis for the electricity generated and 
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exported by eligible installations.228 The current FIT scheme notwithstanding, 
some analysts suggest that solar PV and onshore wind may soon become 
subsidy-free.229 The FIT scheme does not apply to Northern Ireland.230  
Notably, the FIT scheme will come to an end in April 2019.231 The export 
tariff, which offers a guaranteed price for all unused solar electricity, will also 
end; a replacement is expected but in the interim households will in effect be 
giving away surplus power.232 This decision forms a type of “double whammy” 
for solar households because in the aftermath, Ofgem announced the results of 
its Access and Forward-Looking Charging Review and the launch of its 
Significant Code Review in which there will be considerable changes to existing 
access arrangements.233 Critics of the proposals have argued that these 
undermine low carbon efforts by not putting decarbonization at the center of the 
review. There are now fears that the review may result in higher bills for 
households generating solar energy from panels.234 
Since April 2013, the Carbon Price Floor has applied as tax to fossil fuels 
used for energy generation.235 Renewable electricity is exempt from paying this 
tax.236 Northern Ireland secured an exemption from the Carbon Price Floor, 
following concerns about the scheme’s incompatibility with the SEM (now I-
SEM).237 
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iii. Heating and Cooling 
The Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI) is the main source for funding 
renewable heat in the UK.238 The RHI supports eligible installations with a fixed 
amount per kWth produced. The scheme consists of two parts—Domestic and 
Non-Domestic RHI. While the Non-Domestic RHI applies to installations in 
commercial, public, or industrial premises, the Domestic RHI is open to 
homeowners, private landlords, social landlords, and self-builders. The 
government has recently reaffirmed its commitment to the scheme, with further 
reforms likely.239 Northern Ireland had a similar RHI scheme, administered by 
the Department for the Economy, but this scheme was suspended to new 
applicants in February 2016.240 Consultations into the future of the Non-
Domestic NI-RHI are ongoing,241 as is an inquiry into the operation and financial 
implications of the (suspended) NI Non-Domestic RHI scheme.242  
Under the Green Deal scheme,243 home and business owners could obtain a 
loan for certain energy-efficiency measures specified in the Green Deal 
(Qualifying Energy Improvements) Order 2012 and subsequently pay off the 
loan through their energy bill. The Green Deal applied to England, Wales, and 
Scotland. Originally closed in 2015 when the Government withdrew its funding, 
Green Deal loans reopened in 2017 for new applications.244 It is now backed by 
private investors.245 A review of the Green Deal framework is ongoing.246 Grants 
are also available in Northern Ireland via the Northern Ireland Sustainable 
Energy Programme.247 A further series of energy efficiency and heating grants 
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are available via affordable heating schemes, in England and the devolved 
regions.  
An Enhanced Capital Allowance scheme encourages businesses to invest in 
energy efficient plant and machinery.248 Businesses can set up to 100% of the 
cost of assets against taxable profits in the financial year the purchase was made. 
The scheme also applies in Northern Ireland.249 
iv. Transport 
The Renewable Transport Fuel Obligation (RTFO) scheme established a 
quota system for biofuels.250 This has applied since 2007.251 Under the RTFO, 
fuel suppliers for transport and non-road-mobile machinery are obliged to satisfy 
a specified quota number of biofuels in the total supplied fuel.252 A certification 
system provides for proof of compliance.  
The maximum grant now available for cars in the UK is £3,500.253 The plug-
in car grant was cut in early November 2018 by £1,000, while incentives of 
£2,500 to buy new hybrid cars were abolished.254  
In GB, there is currently a Carbon Price Floor, capped at £18 per tonne of 
CO2 until 2021.255 Companies also pay for carbon credits through the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme. If, the UK falls out of the ETS post-Brexit, then 
there may be an incentive to apply an additional Carbon Tax to that applied 
under the ETS scheme.256 
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c. Reflections on the Regulatory Framework 
The UK’s regulatory framework is complex, made more so by the different 
devolution arrangements among the various regions of the UK. Undoubtedly, 
the UK’s ad hoc and somewhat haphazard approach to devolution will continue 
to pose a challenge to the design and implementation of a coherent national 
regulatory framework. The central Westminster government must therefore 
continue to keep the channels of communication open with its regional 
counterparts and ensure close coordination with all. 
Another important consideration for the UK in the short-medium term will 
be the outcome of the ongoing Brexit negotiations.257 The UK’s regulatory 
framework does not seem entirely coherent. The decline in private investment 
and reduction in renewable energy developments should be a major concern, as 
it indicates that the lack of coherency in the regulatory framework is beginning 
to impact green investment. While the Clean Growth Strategy sets out a clear 
pathway to the achievement of its low-carbon transition, it is increasingly 
apparent that strategy alone will not be adequate to meet the country’s targets.  
In response to the growing criticism, the government commissioned a review 
of its electricity market policies. The “Cost of Energy” Review was published 
in October 2017, and recommended a series of changes in response to the 
Review’s central findings: (1) that the cost of energy is higher than necessary to 
meet the Government’s policy objectives; (2) to be consistent with the Climate 
Change Act 2008; and (3) that the regulatory framework and market design is 
“not fit for the purposes of the emerging low-carbon energy market …. ”258 The 
recommendations include: (1) replacing current incentives (FITs and CfDs) for 
low carbon generation with a single carbon price, and a unified capacity auction; 
(2) the replacement of the current specific licensing scheme with a “general” 
license covering distribution, supply and generation; and (3) the creation of a 
National System Operator and Regional System Operator to oversee the 
maintenance, development, and operation of the grid network.259 The 
government has launched a call for evidence on these proposals, but the results 
are pending. 
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2. Energy Security Dimension 
The UK’s energy dependency was estimated at 45.5% while the EU average 
was 53.4%, as of 2014.260 Among the five EU Member States that consume the 
largest amounts of energy—France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK—the 
UK was the one displaying the lowest reliance on energy imports.261 Since the 
early 2000s, the UK has undergone the transition of becoming a net energy 
importer after many years of being a net energy exporter. This pattern has 
become more acute in recent times as the UK increasingly resorts to importing 
energy supplies from abroad to meet its energy needs.262 
The GB system shares cross-border electricity infrastructures with North-
West Europe and the SEM. The manufacture of new cross-border links with 
Norway (NSN and NorthConnect), Denmark (Viking), Germany (NeuConnect), 
Belgium (NEMO), France (GridLink, ElecLink, Aquind, IFA2, and FAB Link), 
and the Republic of Ireland (Greenlink and Greenwire) is relevant.263  
In addition to the Moyle Interconnector, which attaches the Northern Ireland 
grid to the GB grid at Scotland, three interconnectors attach Northern Ireland to 
Ireland (and thus reinforce the links between GB and Ireland). A double circuit 
275kV line runs from Tandragee in Northern Ireland to Louth in Ireland.264 Two 
stand-by 110kV interconnectors connect at Strabane in Tyrone County and 
Enniskillenin in Fermanagh County.265 A new “North South” 400kV overhead 
line is underway.266  
As of 2017, the UK imported 4.2% of its electricity requirements and 36.8% 
of its gas requirements.267 NGET foresees a rise in interconnectors as 
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intermittent renewable energy sources play an increasingly crucial role in 
meeting demand.268 The same, of course, can be said of Northern Ireland.269  
Interesting questions regarding the UK’s security of supply would arise in 
the post-Brexit context. At present, the UK as a whole is part of the IEM, but the 
GB market and the whole-of-Ireland I-SEM function as two distinct, constituent 
markets. If the UK were to stay fully integrated with the IEM after Brexit it 
would need to comply with the EU’s energy market rules, as well as other 
relevant legislation. It would also likely need to accede to the jurisdiction of the 
ECJ, as far as this extended to jurisdiction over the IEM. In the event this proves 
to be politically unpalatable, then the UK may exit from the IEM.  
The UK’s exit from the IEM would impact on the trade of energy through 
the interconnectors, with its energy market decoupled from the EU IEM. Such a 
scenario may result in tariff barriers to the cross-border supply of energy 
between the UK and those participating in the IEM, although the EU does not 
generally apply tariffs to imported energy from non-EU countries.270 However, 
tariffs may apply to products otherwise used in the construction and maintenance 
of the grid. Moreover, the UK’s ongoing interconnection projects would likely 
face new obstacles, with implications for the security of its energy supply.  
The UK is also concerned about the impact of Brexit on the whole-of-Ireland 
I-SEM. BEIS has recommended that the I-SEM be ring-fenced,271 and a number 
of options have been put forward to develop new IEM partnership models, with 
the maintenance of the I-SEM at their heart.272 In the event that the I-SEM cannot 
be maintained, contingency plans are being put in place to establish a separate 
Northern Ireland market.273 Given however that the whole-of-Ireland I-SEM 
will be fully integrated with EU markets prior to Brexit, and in light of the 
potential efficiency losses for the GB market should it exit the IEM, it seems 
that the risk of a whole-of-UK exit from the IEM is relatively distant. Indeed, it 
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is probable that the UK’s preference will be to stay in the IEM and reinforce its 
energy security ties with its European neighbors. 
E. Smart Metering Systems 
The Smart Meter Implementation Programme (SMIP) establishes the legal 
framework for the installation of smart meters, both for gas and electricity, in 
every household in Great Britain by 2020. Predictions are that, by 2020, 
approximately fifty million smart meters would be fitted in approximately thirty 
million properties across England, Scotland, and Wales.274 Over fourteen 
million smart meters have already been installed.275 According to Smart Energy 
GB, a not-for-profit organization, the SMIP represented “the biggest national 
infrastructure project in our lifetimes.”276  
The Data Communications Company (DCC) is the entity charged with the 
control of the smart metering communication system in the UK. However, a 
wide variety of actors has been crucial in the promotion of smart metering 
systems over the last decade. Smart GB, BEIS, Ofgem, as well as the energy 
supplier’s SSE, and British Gas rank among the most enthusiastic supporters of, 
and active participants in, this “smart” transition.277 After several delays, the 
SMIP was officially launched in November 2016.  
At the time of writing, over fourteen million smart meters have been 
deployed. The UK is therefore not on course to achieve its 2020 target. 
According to some, this is because of the UK’s decision to entrust the roll-out 
to energy suppliers and not to the distribution system operators. The EU view 
on smart grid development has been based around an unbundled utility, with the 
freedom to act as a “neutral market facilitator.”278 The UK has departed from 
this approach by handing control of the roll-out to the suppliers, with DSO and 
regulator both having a marginal role. Given its pro-market mentality, this 
decision is unsurprising; but it has proven to be a fundamental mistake. By 
removing smart meters from the regulated asset base, the UK raised the capital 
costs, with customers funding the difference.279 Moreover, with such a variety 
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of energy suppliers participating in the UK’s market, the roll-out has become 
fragmented. The handing over of control to the suppliers was also flawed insofar 
as the government failed to acknowledge that suppliers were driven by profit 
considerations, not grid optimization. Accordingly, their incentives actually 
undermine the neutrality principle that ought to underpin the network. Thus, the 
regulatory incentives and other regulatory mechanisms crucial for the 
encouragement of an efficient roll-out of the program were not present in the 
UK.  
A novel aspect of the smart meter program in the UK, which stems from the 
supplier-led roll-out, is the fact that UK smart meters always include an in-home 
display (IHD), together with a data hub.280 A further distinguishing 
characteristic of the UK is that it pushes separate electricity and gas smart 
meters, increasing the resource burden associated with the roll-out.281 By linking 
other services to the smart meter program, it was much easier for suppliers to 
keep the customer locked in. Thus, despite the pro-market ideology 
underpinning the roll-out, it could be argued that the UK’s program in fact 
facilitated anti-competitive behaviors amongst the incumbent, and most 
dominant, energy suppliers.282 
The SMIP epitomizes the problems which arise when policy aims exceed 
technological capabilities.283 A survey conducted by Utility Week in 2017 
established that more than ten percent of residential properties have required, or 
will need, multiple attempts to install their smart meters correctly.284 Reasons 
for incomplete deployments include: (1) absent customers during installations; 
installations taking longer than anticipated; (2) smart meters being either 
inaccessible or a substantial distance apart; and (3) the challenges presented by 
multiple occupancy properties. As a consequence, it is thought that the costs of 
the SMIP may increase on BEIS estimates by up to one billion pounds.285 If 
these estimates prove to be correct, the total costs of the SMIP would soar to 
twelve billion pounds.286 In light of these difficulties, the Smart Meters Bill was 
introduced in Parliament in October 2017.287 
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The roll-out in the UK has been ambitious, but the implementation of the 
SMIP has not achieved the expected results. Technical challenges have led to a 
retreat from its initial targets. Meanwhile, the decision to put the roll-out in the 
hands of the incumbent energy suppliers made the mistake of obeying the logic 
of the existing system. As a result, the SMIP has not adequately engaged with 
the customer: it boasts of empowerment, without communicating how this 
empowerment results in gains to the customer. The lack of engagement has 
resulted in resistance and apathy towards smart meters; unfortunately, tackling 
this social dimension has not been at the forefront of the SMIP.288 Vulnerability 
(poverty and age), concerns about cyber security and privacy, and the possible 
health effects of the technology have all been identified as translating into 
resistance towards the SMIP.289 Accordingly, understanding what it is that 
consumers want, and tailoring the program to meet this, should be a core focus 
of the SMIP over the coming months and years. 
Given the persistent apathy and even resistance towards the roll-out, it is 
important that control of the SMIP be given to distribution. This has worked 
elsewhere, such as in Ireland. As the focus of distribution is on the optimization 
of the network, it is in a far better position than the incumbent market suppliers 
to implement a roll-out that places customers at its heart. The legislative hurdles 
to this would be significant, but if there was a consensus on putting the 
distributors in charge, then it would be possible to put the necessary contractual 
arrangements in place. Once in the hands of the distributors, the program could 
be made a condition of supply. This would remove the social hurdles currently 
experienced by the SMIP. In addition to rethinking the governance of the 
program, Ofgem and BEIS should consider carefully how to design smart meters 
in a way that responds to the social dimension of the roll-out. In particular, the 
regulator and government should seek to understand the reasons behind the 
rejection rate for smart meters and should consult on how best to encourage 
behavioral change and reductions in energy consumption through the SMIP. 
Note that in Northern Ireland, the Department for the Economy has no 
intention of installing smart meters at present.290 Presumably, any program 
would be informed by smart meters in both GB and Ireland. 
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F. Demand Response 
1. Great Britain 
Harnessing grid flexibility is seen as a central pillar of the transition to a 
smarter, more efficient, and more stable electricity grid. Non-synchronous 
energy sources will put the existing grid under increasing pressure, unless these 
can be harnessed through a more flexible, responsive network. Innovative 
demand side response (DSR) technologies can help to balance non-synchronous 
generation with demand and can therefore provide essential services to the grid. 
Accordingly, DSR technologies play a key role in GB’s energy strategy.  
The market framework for DSR technologies is underpinned by a series of 
publications. Among them is a 2017 Report to the Committee on Climate 
Change, which included the “Roadmap for Flexibility Services to 2030.”291 
BEIS subsequently published its response to its own consultation on a Smart 
Flexible Energy System. This paper was titled “Upgrading Our Energy System: 
A Smart Systems and Flexibility Plan,” and was published in partnership with 
Ofgem.292 A progress update was published in late 2018, with grid flexibility 
continuing to be seen as a central plank of the low-carbon transition.293 The 
significance of the 2017 Plan is underscored by both the Clean Growth Strategy 
of October 2017294 and the Industrial Strategy of November 2017,295 within 
which it features prominently. The government’s commitment to the 2017 Plan 
is demonstrated by its decision to back the framework with £265 million of 
public funds. These funds will be directed towards incentivizing storage 
innovations, as well as accelerating demand response technologies.296 
In 2018, Utility Week, in association with CGI, published the results of its 
research into DSR in a paper entitled Embracing Flexibility: Transforming the 
Power System by 2030.297 It identified that the most significant barriers to 
demand side flexibility remains the lack of a commercial or market framework 
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(identified by 7.1/10), closely followed by the inability to stack value (at 
6.9/10).298 Customer side barriers (identified by 46.9%) are also seen as a 
significant barrier to demand side flexibility projects, only just behind the 
economic barriers (50%).299 These customer side barriers are predominated by 
low levels of customer awareness (identified by 86.7%), which are slowing 
down the adoption of flexible, low carbon technologies and the realization of the 
benefits.300 In light of this, Utility Week has identified that the following 
refinements need to be made to GB’s demand response framework: (1) raising 
consumers’ awareness of the benefits arising from low carbon and connected 
home tech; (2) identifying the technical challenges for projects, including those 
relating to electric vehicles; and (3) delivering a robust market framework. These 
findings are supported by the Demand Side Response: Aligning Risk and 
Reward 2018 Report produced by The Energyst in partnership with National 
Grid, among others.301 
a. Demand Response Market Players 
Currently, DSR providers can deliver services by either reducing their 
demand or taking advantage of onsite generation. Large industrial and 
commercial customers, small to medium enterprises, or aggregators can 
participate.302 The integration of independent aggregators into the market is seen 
as crucial step in the delivery of system flexibility. Ofgem has been a leader in 
driving the necessary changes to market infrastructure.303 
Residential DSR is crucial for achieving electricity system flexibility. 
However, the DSR market remains closed to the domestic prosumer. Time of 
Use tariffs could help to drive changes to domestic consumer behavior, opening 
up the residential market to demand response schemes. Eliminating constraints 
to uptake and response should be a key UK strategy moving forward, whether 
that be through financial incentive schemes, or information-only schemes which 
rely on information campaigns and technologies to encourage behavioral pattern 
changes. UK Power Networks ToU tariff trial appears to have demonstrated that 
domestic consumers would be willing participants in the market; deploying such 
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tariffs on a wider scale could therefore help to engage the residential market in 
demand response technologies.304 
b. Balancing Services 
National Grid offers a number of DSR schemes.305 Only some of the 
available schemes are outlined below, for brevity. 
i. Balancing Mechanism 
The Balancing Mechanism helps National Grid to balance supply and 
demand in close to real time, in each half hourly trading period of every day.306 
During this time National Grid can instruct parties to increase or decrease their 
generation or consumption. All wholesale market participants will register with 
the Balancing Mechanism.  
National Grid is looking into the reform options of the Balancing 
Mechanism, with a view to extending access and removing barriers to entry to 
the mechanism.  
ii. Reserve Services/ Frequency Response 
Short Term Operating Reserve (STOR) is a reserve service for the provision 
of extra power or reduction in demand in terms of grid stress.307 It is a contracted 
balancing service, whereby the service provider delivers a contracted level of 
power on request. A minimum capacity threshold of 3 MW of generation or 
demand reduction applies. Sites below 3 MW may participate via an Aggregator. 
Other reserve schemes include Fast Reserve and Demand Turn Up.308 
Firm Frequency Response (FFR) provides either a dynamic or non-dynamic 
response to changes in frequency.309 There are three response speeds: (1) within 
10 seconds of an event, sustained for 20 seconds; (2) within 30 seconds of event, 
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sustained for further 30 minutes; and (3) within 10 seconds of an event, sustained 
indefinitely.310 A minimum capacity threshold of 1 MW response energy 
applies. FFR was one of the most valuable services on a £/MWh basis, however 
the margins have been eroded. 
iii. Capacity Market311 
The Capacity Market (CM) was established as part of the reform package 
introduced under the Energy Act 2013. The CM seeks to guarantee the 
uninterrupted supply of electricity.312 The CM remunerates demand side 
response providers for lowering demand at times of peak demand.313 The CM is 
delivered and implemented by National Grid. 
Auctions are organized either one (T-1 Auctions) or four (T-4 Auctions) 
years ahead of the year in which capacity must be supplied. The third main CM 
auction was successfully concluded in the 2016 T-4 Auction (for delivery in 
2020–2021).314 Around 70GW of capacity entered the process, with 75% of 
capacity (52.4 GW) securing capacity agreements at a total forecast cost of 
£1.18b (in 2016 prices).315 A supplementary auction followed in February 2017, 
with 54.4GW of capacity secured.316 Preceding full entry into the CM in 2018–
2019, DSR was offered targeted support by way of two Transitional 
Arrangements Auctions, the second of which secured 312MW of capacity.317  
DSR providers may now deliver their services via the CM. However, despite 
its claim of technology neutrality, there are considerable barriers to DSR’s 
effective participation in the CM. In order to participate in the CM, DSR must 
have a (proven or unproven) capacity of not less than 2MW, according to the 
Capacity Market Rules.318 Moreover, the capacity agreements vary significantly 
in length. While electricity generators can bid for contracts between three and 
fifteen years, all other capacity providers including DSR can only acquire a one-
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year contract.319 DSR must also provide a capital bond (a “bid bond”) when 
bidding for one-year contracts.320 This means that DSR is placed at a 
considerable disadvantage when competing on the CM. DSR providers are also 
troubled by the government’s decision to reduce T-1 auction volume, out of 
concerns that the smaller volume may mean that DSR providers can easily be 
outbid by a larger power station.321 Another worrying development has been the 
recent suggestion, by the utility Scottish Power, that DSR which uses behind-
the-meter batteries will be subject to the same deratings as standalone batteries 
treated as generating assets. This proposal has been described as “misguided” 
by DSR experts, not least because it fails to recognize the flexibility inherent in 
turn-down DSR, and its different characteristics and capabilities.322  
Notably, the CM in the UK has been temporarily suspended following the 
recent European Court decision that the Commission failed to adequately 
investigate the plan for the CM prior to formally approving it.323 In particular, 
the court concluded that the Commission did not analyze whether the difference 
in treatment between DSR and generators was appropriate.324 It is likely that 
some form of market redesign will now be necessary. Given the barriers that 
DSR faces when participating in the market, it is clear that there is scope to 
intelligently update the model. Removing the capital bond and extending the 
length of contracts available are two examples of possible improvements. The 
government is aware of the need to refine the market, but at present it continues 
to be driven by logic of the incumbent, large generation facilities. Until this 
underlying bias is removed, the capacity market will likely continue to fall short 
with regard to DSR.  
Finally, and aside from the DSR issues, there have been long-standing calls 
to open up the CM to renewables—the government has now identified this as a 
high priority strategic goal.325 Renewables have to date been largely precluded 
 
 319 See Capacity Market Standstill: The Perfect Time to Move Forwards, SMARTESTENERGY (July 2, 
2019), https://smartestenergy.com/info-hub/blog/capacity-market-standstill-the-perfect-time-to-move-forwards/.  
 320 See ELECTRICITY: THE CAPACITY MARKET RULES 2014, supra note 318, at 51 (defining “Applicant 
Credit Cover”).  
 321 HOUSE OF COMMONS: ENERGY & CLIMATE CHANGE COMMITTEE, THE ENERGY REVOLUTION AND 
FUTURE CHALLENGES FOR UK ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY: THIRD REPORT OF SESSION 2016–17, at 
17 [hereinafter THE ENERGY REVOLUTION]. 
 322 B. Coyne, Should Ofgem Consider Derating DSR Plus Battery Storage? Aggregators Weigh In, 
ENERGYST (Mar. 23, 2018), https://theenergyst.com/ofgem-right-consider-derating-capacity-market-dsr-aggregators-
weigh/.  
 323 Case T-793/14, Tempus Energy Ltd. v. European Comm’n, ECLI:EU:T:2018:790, ¶ 37. 
 324 Id.  
 325 HM GOV., DELIVERING CLEAN GROWTH: PROGRESS AGAINST MEETING OUR CARBON BUDGETS–THE 
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE COMMITTEE ON CLIMATE CHANGE 23 (2018).  
LEAL-ARCASETALPROOFS_3.25.20 5/3/2020 12:22 PM 
2020] FINANCE FOR SUSTAINABLE ENERGY 519 
from bidding in the auction, as they are almost entirely supported by subsidies. 
However, with solar and onshore wind likely to be viable without subsidies in 
the near future, it is possible that a raft of new projects could soon be eligible to 
enter the CM. The government is examining how renewables could be integrated 
in the future and is currently consulting with stakeholders on a possible redesign 
of the CM mechanism. 
2. Northern Ireland 
DSR is managed through the whole-of-island I-SEM. Accordingly, it is a 
joint undertaking regulated by the CRU and UREGNI, with the TSOs and DSOs 
also engaged in the establishment of a viable market framework. 
a. Demand Response Market Players 
Consumers can participate in demand side response through tariff-based 
schemes, including Economy 7 (Northern Ireland). In addition to individual 
demand side participation, medium to large users can participate in a Demand 
Side Unit (DSU) or Aggregated Generating Unit (AGU).326 A DSU consists of 
one or more individual demand sites, which can reduce their demand as 
requested by the TSO (SONI in Northern Ireland, EirGrid in Ireland). A DSU 
can contract with other DSUs, and aggregate these to form a single, aggregated 
unit.  
As with the UK, the domestic prosumer is currently precluded from entry 
into the demand side market. However, the I-SEM is working towards the 
integration of domestic customers into future demand response services. The 
DSOs are investing in the grid to ensure that projected capacity—in particular 
that arising from the smart meter roll-out—is realized.327 
b. Capacity Market 
A single capacity market operates across the whole of the island of Ireland. 
Generators are encouraged to participate in the Irish CM through a mechanism 
called the Capacity Remuneration Mechanism.328 These payments are made 
available through a competitive auction process under the I-SEM. 
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The capacity auction market is now fully functional, although teething issues 
have been identified. DSUs are able to participate in the capacity auction market 
as generators. However, it has been revealed that DSUs with a limited duration 
for demand reduction (of less than or equal to 6 hours) will now receive the same 
de-rating factors applied to energy storage, despite the fact that demand response 
and storage are completely different technologies.329 This change will apply 
from capacity year 2019–2020. Critics argue that this will discourage demand 
side response providers from participating within I-SEM and the Irish CM by 
reducing the available revenues.  
The CRM has received State Aid clearance from the European 
Commission.330 However, the changes relating to DSUs may leave the CRM 
open to the accusation that demand-side response technologies are being 
hampered from participating effectively alongside generation. This is 
particularly pertinent given the recent ruling of the General Court of the 
European Union, which has resulted in the temporary suspension of the UK 
market.331 
3. Reflections on Demand Response 
There are still formidable barriers to DSR in the UK and Northern Ireland, 
with revenue and policy uncertainty posing significant obstacles to prospective 
participants. Improving business knowledge and understanding about the 
various DSR schemes will be key. To this end, National Grid’s System Needs 
and Product Strategy (SNAPS) publication, which sought feedback on how to 
simplify current balancing schemes, was a welcome development in the UK 
space. Since then, National Grid has produced three roadmaps: (1) Product 
Roadmap for Frequency Response and Reserve; (2) Product Roadmap for 
Restoration; and (3) Product Roadmap for Reactive Power, with a series of 
deliverables which set out to encourage more widespread participation in the 
balancing services market.332 However, the complexities of the market mean that 
a straightforward, independent industry guide to DSR is well overdue. 
Collaboration by National Grid with the market incumbents (suppliers, 
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aggregators) on such a project could therefore be most advantageous. 
G. Data Protection 
The Data Protection Act 1998 articulates the basic legal framework in the 
UK.333 Despite the UK’s decision to withdraw from the EU, Regulation (EU) 
679/2016, also known as General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), will still 
be applicable to the UK while it remains a part of the EU.334 Meanwhile, 
companies doing business with the EU post-Brexit will need to comply with the 
GDPR due to its extraterritorial reach. The Data Protection Act 2018 
complements the GDPR and is now fully in force.335  
The national data protection authority is the Information Commissioner’s 
Officer (ICO).336 The ICO promotes transparency in public entities and 
safeguards data privacy for citizens.337 To this end, it provides guidance to both 
citizens and organizations and enforces compliance with relevant regulations. 
Where consumption data comes with information that could be used to 
determine the identity of, and limited information about, a consumer, that 
consumption data is treated as personal data.338 Accordingly, the access of 
parties to information of this nature is subjected to compliance with the 
applicable legislative instruments. More concretely, those wishing to access this 
electricity data must observe the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998—
in respect of treatment of personal data. As well the Privacy and Electronic 
Communications Regulations 2003—with regard to the privacy of consumers 
using communication network or services. Further, the electricity distribution 
license delineates in its Condition 10A (SLC10A) the terms and requirements 
under which DSOs can obtain, access and use consumption data provided by 
smart metering systems.339 Pursuant to 10A.2, licensees must not, subject to 
certain conditions, obtain consumption data relating to a period of less than one 
month.340 There are also restrictions on the use of data. DSOs must submit “data 
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privacy plans” to the national regulator, Ofgem. In these plans, the network 
operators clarify the manner in which the consumption data will be anonymized, 
to ensure that the processed data cannot be used to identify a particular 
household.341  
In 2012, the government conducted research into the public’s attitude 
towards data and privacy in relation to smart metering. The result was the Smart 
Metering Data Access and Privacy: Public Attitudes Research document, 
published in December 2012.342 A particular concern was the perceived 
intrusiveness of frequent meter readings, and some respondents were suspicious 
about the level of detail collected. Reservations about data protection persisted. 
Certain security risks were also identified: in particular, the fact that more 
detailed data could be used, theoretically, to identify a consumer’s absence from 
their home.343  
The Data Access and Privacy Framework (DAPF) for smart meters regulates 
the use of customer’s energy consumption data stemming from smart meters.344 
This Framework determines the access by market participants to energy 
consumption data. The precise granularity of the data that can be accessed is 
dependent on whether the consumer has decided to opt in or out of the program. 
The DAPF issues the following basic instructions to energy suppliers:  
By default, energy suppliers can access monthly and daily consumption data 
in the interest of billing and accounting. 
Provided the supplier has the customer’s consent, or the customer has not 
opted out, energy suppliers can access consumption data more detailed than 
monthly, but not more detailed than daily. 
If the customer decides to opt in, energy suppliers can access more detailed 
data, down to half-hourly data.345 
Energy network operators can only access data relating to periods of less 
than one month if they have obtained the consumer’s consent to do so or have 
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implemented Ofgem-approved procedures relating to the anonymization of that 
data. No restrictions are imposed on the network operator or supplier regarding 
access to other (non-consumption) data, provided that access complies with 
existing data legislation.346 Rules apply to third party access to consumption 
data. 
The existing framework has been supplemented by the Smart Meters Act 
2018 (which extends to England, Wales, and Scotland only).347 The SMA 2018 
has granted Ofgem additional powers to implement market-wide Half-Hourly 
(HH) Settlement Data for domestic and smaller non-domestic customers.348 As 
part of its review into the settlement arrangements for HH data, Ofgem is 
considering three options: (1) an “Opt-In” program, where access is subject to 
existing rules; (2) an “Opt-Out” program, where there is a legal obligation on 
the responsible settlement party to process HH data unless the consumer opts-
out; or (3) a “Mandatory” option.349 Two additional enhanced privacy options 
are also being considered: (1) anonymization of data post-settlement; and (2) a 
“hidden identity” option which would entail the “pseudonymization” of data 
through the use of a unique identifier which obscures the consumer’s “real 
world” identity.350 Ofgem is currently consulting on the issue, although 
responses have now closed.351  
Privacy concerns continue to be one of the major hurdles to the public uptake 
of smart metering technology: assuaging these concerns is therefore one of the 
main challenges for those supporting the roll-out. The UK’s regulatory 
framework has been bolstered by the GDPR, but the data management model 
that will emerge post-Brexit remains an unknown. While it is likely that the 
UK’s post-Brexit data management model will take its lead from the provisions 
of the GDPR, not least because the unravelling of the data privacy framework 
would be of huge, and vocal, public interest, the UK’s pro-market tendencies 
loom large on the agenda. To date, it has placed the responsibility for the smart 
metering roll-out securely in the hands of the suppliers. It must therefore ensure 
that whatever data management model it ends up with establishes an appropriate 
balance between these commercial interests and the public’s data privacy 
concerns.  
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H. Electric Vehicles and Energy Storage 
1. Electric Vehicles 
Pursuant to the Climate Change Act 2008, the UK has set itself the objective 
to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 80% by 2050, with Electric Vehicles forming 
a key part of the UK’s strategy.352 The UK government has taken a number of 
steps with respect to the promotion of EVs, including the establishment of the 
Office for Low Emissions Vehicles (OLEV).353 It has also promoted the 
discontinuation of petrol and diesel cars in the UK from 2040 onwards.354  
EVs feature prominently in BEIS’s Industrial Strategy. The government has 
established a £30 million fund to promote Vehicles-to-Grid technologies, with 
the aim of delivering a design and development model which illustrates how the 
electricity system could, at peak hours, benefit from the power stored in EVs.355  
Infrastructure is viewed as one of the main obstacles to the uptake of EVs. 
The Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018 endeavors to address this gap by 
giving the government new powers to require charging points be built at all 
motorway service stations and “large fuel retailers.”356 The Act builds on the 
Alternative Fuels Infrastructure Regulations 2017, including powers to create a 
uniform method of accessing charging points, and establish reliability 
standards.357 Notably, the part of the Act dealing with charging infrastructure 
applies to the whole of the UK. 
The powers under the 2018 Act have been matched by the creation of the 
new Charging Infrastructure Investment Fund, in July 2018.358 The CIIF is a 
£400 million fund, of which £200 million is government funding; the private 
sector will put forward the remaining £200 million.359  
The government will also support infrastructure development by way of 
 
 352 HOUSE OF PARLIAMENT: OFF. OF SCI. & TECH., ELECTRIC VEHICLES: POSTNOTE No. 265, 2010 (U.K.). 
 353 Office for Low Emission Vehicles, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/office-
for-low-emission-vehicles (last visited Feb. 24, 2020). 
 354 ENERGY UK, THE ELECTRIC VEHICLE REVOLUTION: A REPORT FROM ENERGY UK 4 (2017).  
 355 £30 Million Investment in Revolutionary V2G Technologies, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/ 
government/news/30-million-investment-in-revolutionary-v2g-technologies. (last visited Feb. 24, 2020). 
 356 Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018, c. 18 (UK).  
 357 See The Alternative Fuels Infastructure Regulations 2017, No. 897 (UK).  
 358 See Charging Infastructure Investment Fund, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/government/ 
publications/charging-infrastructure-investment-fund (last visited Feb. 24, 2020). 
 359 Details of the Operation of the Charging Infastructure Investment Fund, GOV.UK (Sept. 2019), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/834758/Deta
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grant schemes. The Electric Vehicle Homecharge Scheme360 is continuing and 
the Workplace Charging Scheme grant has been increased from a maximum of 
£300 to a maximum of £500 per socket.361 A second round of funding for local 
authorities to roll out low emission taxi charge point infrastructure is also 
planned, with £6 million available.362  
As noted in Section iv above, the maximum grant now available for UK 
purchasers of EVs is £3,500.363 The plug-in car grant was cut in early November 
2018 by £1,000, while the grant worth £2,500 to buy new hybrid cars was 
abolished altogether.364 The decision to cut the available incentives has been 
described as “astounding.”365 While it is positive that some incentives remain in 
place, the decision does risk undermining progress on the low-emission and EV 
sectors. 
Taxation is an area which has not garnered much focus from the government 
to date. The 2018 National Infrastructure Assessment recognizes that there may 
be a need for the government to consider a road pricing scheme, particular as 
revenue from fuel duty/vehicle excise duty decreases.366 In addition to protecting 
tax revenue, an adequate pricing scheme would also help to finance road 
infrastructure development. However, despite the 2018 NIA’s recommendation, 
the government has not moved any moves to bring this to the forefront of its EV 
policy.  
Finally, the Electric Vehicle Energy Taskforce has been launched to help to 
bring energy and transport sectors together to plan for EV uptake, and to ensure 
that the electricity system can meet future demand.367 The creation of the EVET 
signals the collaborative approach which underlies the UK’s efforts to drive 
progress in the low emission transport sector. With regard to the most critical 
 
 360 See generally OFF. FOR LOW EMISSION VEHICLES, CUSTOMER GUIDANCE: ELECTRIC VEHICLE 
HOMECHARGE SCHEME (2019),  
 361 See OFF. FOR LOW EMISSION VEHICLES, WORKPLACE CHARGING SCHEME GUIDANCE FOR APPLICANTS, 
INSTALLERS AND MANUFACTURERS 2 (2019).  
 362 See OFFICE FOR LOW EMISSION VEHICLES, ULTRA LOW EMISSION TAXI INFRASTRUCTURE SCHEME: 
WINNERS, (2018).  
 363 Low-Emission Vehicles Eligible for a Plug-in Grant, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/plug-in-car-van-
grants (last visited Feb. 24, 2020). 
 364 Gwyn Topham, Scrapping UK Grants for Hybrid Cars ‘Astounding’, Says Industry, GUARDIAN, 12 
Oct. 12, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/oct/12/scrapping-uk-grants-for-hybrid-cars-
astounding-says-industry (last visited Nov. 3, 2019). 
 365 Id. 
 366 See generally NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE COMMISSION, NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE ASSESSMENT 
(2018). 
 367 See ENERGY TASKFORCE, ENERGISING OUR ELECTRIC VEHICLE TRANSITION.  
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players, the National Infrastructure Committee envisages a key role for Ofgem 
in terms of regulating electric vehicles.368 EVs also feature strongly in each of 
National Grid’s latest Future Energy Scenarios. National Grid now predicts that 
there could be as many as 11 million EVs by 2030 and 36 million by 2050.369 
However, National Grid anticipates that smart charging technologies, consumer 
behavior changes (charging at off-peak times) and V2G technology should mean 
that the increase in peak electricity demand could be as little as 8GW in 2040.370 
Making this a reality will require close collaboration with all key stakeholders, 
including industry and research and development. However, the establishment 
of the EVET indicates that the UK is on the right track. 
2. Energy Storage 
BNEF forecasts that the global energy market is set to double six times by 
2030, with the UK projected to play a key role in global growth.371 Aurora 
Energy Research has found that storage must play a key part in the UK’s energy 
strategy, with 13GW of additional distributed and flexible generation assets 
needed by 2030 to balance the UK’s electricity grid as more renewable projects 
come online.372 Battery storage is thought to be likely to grow fifty times 
compared to 2017 levels by the end of 2022.373 Opportunities for storage assets 
will be driven forward by falling technology costs, as will the emergence of new 
revenue streams through the balancing, ancillary services and capacity markets. 
Storage technologies feature prominently in the UK’s nationwide energy 
strategy. Storage was a key consideration in the National Grid’s System Needs 
and Product Strategy (SNaPS), published on June 13, 2017.374 Meanwhile, 
Ofgem has published a response to its “A Smart, Flexible Energy System: Call 
for Evidence” consultation. This response includes the Smart Systems and 
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 370 Id.  
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Flexibility Plan which sets out the proposed approach for integrating flexible 
and smart technologies into the evolving UK energy system.375  
The auction cleared at £6/kW per year. Meanwhile, GE has announced that 
its largest grid-scale battery storage system project (41MW) to date will be 
located in the UK.376 A giant 50MW battery storage facility is also planned. The 
facility will utilize technology provided by SMA Sunbelt Energy, a fully owned 
subsidiary of German energy storage specialist SMA Solar Technology AG.377 
Flexible services provider Battery Energy Storage Solutions (BESS) has also 
just raised more than $100 million in U.S. dollars in investment to target UK 
projects totaling 100MW.378 In the residential market, Nissan announced in 
January 2018 that it will be providing a system of solar panels and batteries to 
UK homes, stating that customers could save up to 66% on energy bills through 
their service.379 Further, UK-based energy storage and smart home firm Moixa 
has recently launched a new 4.8kWh battery storage device for domestic use, 
with an output of 1000W.380  
Thus, the energy storage market has demonstrated its potential for significant 
growth in the coming years. The commitment of the regulator and TSO, together 
with infrastructural and regulatory developments showing both private and 
public commitment to increasing the role of storage on the UK electricity grid, 
have reinforced the role of storage in the UK’s transition strategy. 
Nevertheless, there are gaps in the framework. These include those identified 
by Ofgem, and it is heartening that the regulator is leading the charge in creating 
a more robust, friendly market framework. An area that requires particular 
attention in the UK, as elsewhere, is the lack of a regulatory definition for the 
concept of energy storage. Article 2, paragraph 2, point (d) (i) of The Electricity 
(Class Exemptions from the Requirement of a License) Order 2001, which 
confirms that the operator of “equipment” which “is generating or is capable of 
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generating electricity” will be regarded as generating electricity has led to the 
situation where storage is treated as a generation asset.381 The categorization as 
generation asset means that the current definition fails to acknowledge the 
particularities of storage technologies. It also means that storage operators 
currently need to hold a generation license to operate unless an exemption 
applies (e.g. a “small generator” exemption). A separate asset class for storage 
would provide greater flexibility on who can own, operate and use storage, and 
the government appears open to the idea.382 Ofgem also appears to have the view 
that storage should be defined as a distinct form of generation, as well as that 
new licensing arrangements should be introduced—these and other 
developments are awaited eagerly.383 The results of a consultation relating to the 
regulatory regime for storage are eagerly awaited.384 
Under the dominant legal framework, the energy storage operator also faces 
the risk of double-charging. The Climate Change Levy (General) Regulations 
2001 established a UK-wide levy on supplies of “taxable commodities,” which 
include the supply of electricity (but also gas, LPG and solid fuels) to business 
and public sector users. The main rates are paid by energy suppliers, with costs 
passed on to the consumer. The energy storage operator may end up paying 
double charges. The energy storage operator is legally classified as both an 
electricity consumer and generator. This leads to double-charging, with storage 
facilities charged once for the energy consumed (when charging) and then again 
for the energy they supply. The end-user is then charged for consuming the 
energy supplied by the storage facility. Appropriate use-of-system charges 
should therefore be put in place, with charges based on the actual power 
consumed. The lack of clarity around the current system poses a considerable 
regulatory barrier and adds to the perceived risks for investors.385 In light of the 
double-charging issue, Ofgem has consulted on amendments to energy storage 
licenses; a decision on this is pending.386 
Given that battery storage is still an emerging technology, the regulator must 
also consider carefully how to maximize its revenue streams. Revenue channels 
 
 381 See The Electricity (Class Exemptions from the Requirement for a Licence) Order 2001, No. 3720, art. 
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may include a mixture of frequency response, capacity market payments, 
TRIAD revenue, and power supply payments. The challenge for the regulator 
will be to facilitate the construction of projects that can take advantage of 
multiple streams and demonstrate their bankability. A key issue in terms of the 
bankability of projects over the next few years is likely to be the extent to which 
storage applications can be readily combined with renewable energy generators 
accredited under the RO and FIT schemes. Ofgem has recently released draft 
guidance seeking to clarify its existing guidance on these requirements.387 
Removing the regulatory barriers to the capacity market, such as the restrictions 
on contract duration and projects receiving subsidies, should also be 
considered.388 
In light of the above it is clear that there are still marked barriers to storage. 
It is encouraging however to see the regulator taking the lead in seeking 
feedback on the current state of affairs. Indeed, Ofgem issued in July 2018 
another new consultation on reforming access and forward-looking charging 
arrangements in light of the emergence of, among other technologies, storage.389 
The consultation focused on how best to maximize the benefits of grid 
flexibility. Notably, it seeks input from all relevant stakeholders—from 
consumers as well as electricity market players. The decision on this 
consultation was published in December 2018, and a Significant Code Review 
has now been launched.390 
CONCLUSIONS 
The UK has made considerable progress towards meeting its 2020 targets. 
In 2017, the UK saw renewable energy’s share of electricity generation jump to 
29%.391 With the UK now comfortably producing one quarter of its electricity 
from renewables, the overall target of 15% consumption from renewables seems 
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increasingly achievable. With regard to its energy saving target of 18% by 2020, 
primary energy consumption fell by 15% and final energy consumption by 11% 
in 2015, compared to 2007.392 Meanwhile, the UK’s greenhouse gas emissions 
were 43% below 1990 levels in 2017.393 The UK has met both its first and second 
carbon budgets, and is on track to meet its third. However, efforts must be 
accelerated if the UK is to meet its subsequent carbon budgets.  
The UK’s energy mix has transformed in recent years, with coal generation 
now comprising a negligible amount of its energy requirements. In 2016, coal 
accounted for only 2% of total production—a record low.394 Meanwhile, low 
carbon energy sources (both nuclear and renewable) are featuring more 
prominently. Primary electricity sources (nuclear, and wind and solar) and 
bioenergy and waste accounted for 16% and 9% of total production in 2016, 
respectively.395 Nevertheless, fossil fuels in the form of oil and gas continue to 
be an important source of the UK’s energy supply. In 2016, oil accounted for 
42% and natural gas 32% of total production.396 Yet, while nuclear is often 
classified as a clean energy source, there are problems associated with 
decommissioning and safety. Moreover, the new projects have proven to be 
costly and will have a long development period. Crucially therefore, renewable 
energy sources contributed to 29% of electricity generation in 2017.397 In 2017, 
renewables’ share of the overall primary energy mix actually overtook nuclear 
energy’s share, at 11.3%.398  
While the UK has considerable natural resources of its own, it is now a net 
importer of energy. In 2017, the UK’s net import dependency was 35.8%.399 
Securing its energy supply will be crucial in the Brexit aftermath, and will 
undoubtedly be one of the primary considerations when making the decision to 
remain, or leave, the internal energy market. At present, Scotland is a key driver 
of the UK’s energy transition: thus, if the UK wishes to jointly wean itself off 
fossil fuels but rely on indigenous resources, it will find itself increasingly reliant 
on Scotland. For the time being, this arrangement may be satisfactory. But if 
Scotland were to become independent, as continues to be threatened, then the 
UK may have to rethink its energy security strategy. 
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The UK has a clear strategy for the transition to a low carbon economy; this 
is backed by a comprehensive regulatory framework for the integration of non-
synchronous generation. But observers are troubled by the downward trend in 
green investment. The withdrawal of governmental support schemes for solar at 
a time of considerable market uncertainty appears to have compounded investor 
uncertainty.400 Meanwhile, regulatory changes in 2015 appear to have created 
an unfriendly planning environment for onshore wind development.401 
Moreover, regulatory hurdles to the treatment of storage and demand response 
also remain in place. The overall picture of the UK’s energy policy is therefore 
one of imprecision and inconsistency; its ostensibly clear strategy is not matched 
by a coherent regulatory framework.  
With regard to digitalization, the UK has been one of the countries at the 
forefront of the smart meter transition. Yet the program has not been without its 
challenges. There are a number of novel aspects about the UK’s approach to the 
roll-out, but the one that has caused perhaps the most issues for the UK has been 
the decision to place the roll-out in the hands of the utility suppliers. Resistance 
to smart meters also remains entrenched in the residential market. There have 
been calls for the regulator to try to understand better why the acceptance rate 
of smart meters is so low.402 More work on this should be done in order to 
facilitate the smart grid transition. 
The UK has therefore made progress towards establishing a smarter, more 
secure, and more responsive electricity grid. Decarbonization is central to its 
energy strategy, with renewable energy sources now taking an increasing share 
of both energy production and electricity generation. Meanwhile, the UK’s 
commitment to decentralization and digitalization underpins the moderate 
successes of its smart meter program. Yet the UK has made its missteps. In 
particular, the UK has found itself paying too much heed to the logic of the 
incumbent fossil fuel industry. To give but a handful of examples, the UK has 
cut solar subsidies at the same time as it has re-started its hydraulic fracking 
program. It also promotes nuclear, even as the risks of decommissioning and 
safety give rise to questions about nuclear energy’s clean credentials. The UK 
also sustains barriers to storage and DSR technologies with respect to the 
capacity market, allowing fossil fuels to dominate the subsidies. Finally, it has 
put the smart metering program in the grip of the utility incumbents, exposing 
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the program to the dictates of profit maximization rather than grid optimization. 
Unfortunately, these lapses have resulted in a policy and regulatory framework 
that is not entirely coherent.  
Moving forward, the UK must take care to consult with all stakeholders in 
terms of planning its future grid strategy. Ofgem continues to do good work in 
this respect; only a small number of its publications have been referenced in this 
paper, but they nonetheless give a flavor for its striking activism. In broad terms, 
the smart grid transition hinges on the decarbonization, digitalization, and 
democratization of the grid. Accordingly, the UK must consider how best to re-
orientate its position so that renewable energy forms the central plank of its 
strategy in the years to come. Promoting green investment and righting the 
downward trend in investment witnessed in recent years, should therefore be a 
priority. The smart grid transition also represents an unprecedented opportunity 
to democratize the grid. However, the promised democratization of the grid will 
require the domestic consumer to be engaged in the transition. Thus, it will be 
important, with respect to the smart metering program, for the social dimension 
of the roll-out to be fully taken into account. The levels of apathy and 
discontentment outlined in Section E will pose a significant hurdle to the 
transition to locally based networks. In particular, therefore, the smart grid 
transition must focus on how to best integrate the consumer into the smart grid 
as an active party. To do this, it will be necessary to break with the logic of the 
existing market framework, and to view the consumer as a market player in their 
own right. 
 
